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Konsta Ruutu 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CHOICE OF ISSUE METHOD IN SEASONED 
EQUITY OFFERINGS – European evidence 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of the thesis is to provide new evidence on seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) in Europe. The thesis addresses the lack of empirical research on different 
public issue types, in particular the distinction between fully marketed offerings and 
accelerated offers, in addition to studying ownership characteristics. More specifically, 
new evidence is provided on the influence of the issue method, institutional ownership, 
and ownership concentration on the offer price discount, announcement effect, and 
long-run post-issue returns; and to whether ownership characteristics affect the choice 
of issue method.  
 
DATA 
The data on SEOs employed in the thesis is sourced from the Dealogic database, which 
provides the needed classification for the issue type absent in the SDC database. The 
sample consists of SEOs carried out in Europe during the period 2000-2005, with the 
total number of SEOs amounting to 364. The data on ownership characteristics consists 
of pre and post-issue institutional holding and ownership concentration, and has been 
manually handpicked from Thomson Financial. Data on various firm characteristics is 
sourced  from Thomson Financial  and  Dealogic,  while  stock  prices  and  market  indices  
are retrieved from Datastream. 
 
RESULTS 
The results indicate that SEOs which are carried out by a fully marketed process suffer 
to a lesser extent from the offer price discount than SEOs which are carried out by an 
accelerated process. On the other hand, ownership characteristics do not seem to affect 
the offer price discount. The announcement effect is not affected by the issue method or 
ownership characteristics. Additionally, high ownership concentration is negatively 
associated with 24 and 36-month post-issue returns. High institutional holding is 
positively  associated  with  24-month  post-issue  returns  –  however  this  result  is  not  
observable for 36-month returns. The issue method does not seem to affect post-issue 
returns. Finally, SEOs which are characterized by high pre-issue institutional ownership 
and low pre-issue ownership concentration are likely to be carried out by an accelerated 
process.  
 
KEYWORDS 
Seasoned equity offering, issue method, ownership structure, institutional ownership, 
ownership concentration, offer price discount, long-run underperformance  
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TAVOITTEET 
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on tuottaa uutta tutkimustietoa osakeanneista Euroopassa. 
Tutkimus keskittyy eri antitapojen eroavaisuuksiin sekä omistusrakenteen vaikutuksiin. 
Erityisesti tutkimus tarkastelee millä tavalla annin järjestelytapa, instituutio-omistus 
sekä omistuksen keskittyneisyys vaikuttavat annin hinnoitteluun, annin 
julkistusvaikutukseen, sekä pitkän aikavälin menestykseen. Lisäksi tutkimus selvittää 
omistusrakenteen vaikutusta annin järjestelytapaan.  
 
AINEISTO 
Tutkimuksen aineisto koostuu Euroopassa järjestetyistä osakeanneista vuosina 2000-
2005. Osakeantiaineisto on peräisin Dealogic tietokannasta, joka tarjoaa tarkan 
luokituksen annin järjestelytavasta, antien kokonaislukumäärän ollessa 364. Aineisto 
omistusrakenteesta koostuu ennen antia sekä annin jälkeen vallitsevasta instituutio-
omistuksen tasosta sekä omistuksen keskittyneisyydestä. Omistusrakenne on 
manuaalisesti haettu Thomson Financial tietokannasta. Muu aineisto yrityskohtaisista 
muuttujista on haettu Thomson Financial sekä Dealogic tietokannoista, kun taas 
osakekurssi- ja indeksiaineisto on peräisin Datastream tietokannasta. 
 
TULOKSET 
Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, että annit joita edeltävät perusteellinen 
markkinointiprosessi kärsivät vähemmän alihinnoittelusta kuin muut annit. Toisaalta 
omistusrakenne ei näytä vaikuttavan annin alihinnoitteluun. Annin järjestelytapa tai 
omistusrakenne ei vaikuta annin julkistusvaikutukseen. Korkea omistuksen 
keskittyneisyys vaikuttaa negatiivisesti 24 ja 36 kuukauden annin jälkeisiin tuottoihin. 
Korkea instituutio-omitus vaikuttaa positiivisesti 24 kuukauden annin jälkeisiin 
tuottoihin – tämä suhde ei kuitenkaan ole havaittavissa 36 kuukauden tuotoissa. 
Toisaalta annin järjestelytapa ei näytä vaikuttavan pitkän aikavälin annin jälkeisiin 
tuottoihin. Lisäksi, annit joissa on matala instituutio-omistus sekä korkea omistuksen 
keskittyneisyys järjestetään todennäköisemmin perusteellisen markkinointiprosessin 
edeltämänä.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background and motivation 
Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) are an important source of funding for exchange-listed 
companies. However, they do not receive as much attention as initial public offerings (IPOs), 
in which a non-listed company raises equity by listing in a stock exchange. The volume of 
SEOs rose in 2009, partly due to companies needing additional financial without having the 
possibility of going to the debt markets due to high leverage ratios. Moreover, IPO volumes in 
2009 were particularly low, with investors being risk averse and hesitant to finance risky IPO 
companies. These factors contribute to SEOs being an interesting and contemporary topic of 
study. Most studies published in academic journals have documented SEOs in the US, with 
only a handful focusing on European or other stock markets. Due to this, I have chosen 
Europe as the geography in the thesis.  
Seasoned equity offerings have been studied widely in academic literature. Perhaps the most 
documented phenomenon has been the negative announcement effect of SEOs, which 
indicates that equity issues convey negative information about the issuing company to the 
market. Other popular research areas relating to SEOs include the run-up preceding the issue, 
the long-run underperformance of issuing companies, the pricing of the issue, and the choice 
of issue method between public and rights issues. However, academic literature has lacked a 
theoretical or empirical treatment of the choice between accelerated offers versus traditional 
fully marketed offerings. Especially as accelerated offers (versus fully marketed offers) have 
lately increased in popularity, the choice of public issue method is an interesting topic of 
study. 
The role of institutional investors in SEOs has been studied up to some extent, but not to the 
same magnitude as is the case with IPOs. The role of institutional investors has increased in 
recent years, making it an interesting topic of study. For example, institutional investors in 
2003 controlled 59.2% of the equity outstanding in the US ($7.97 trillion), compared with 
only 28.4% or $376 billion in 1980 (Chemmanur et al., 2009). Ownership concentration in 
SEOs  has  been  studied  to  some  extent.  Most  studies  have  concentrated  on  comparing  how  
concentration is increased more in rights offerings versus public offerings (e.g. Kothare, 
2007). However, ownership concentration in different public issue types has not been 
documented to the same extent.  
2 
 
 
In this thesis, I study how the issue method and ownership structure affect the pricing of the 
issue, the announcement effect, and the long-run performance of the issuing company. More 
precisely, I look at the level of institutional holding and ownership concentration in SEO 
firms prior and subsequent to the offering. Additionally, I inspect how the choice of issue 
method is affected by ownership characteristics. I focus on three public issue types: fully 
marketed offerings, accelerated bookbuilt offerings, and bought deals. Rights offers have been 
left out of the study due to their different nature from the abovementioned public offer types.   
1.2. Research questions 
This thesis studies how the choice of issue method and ownership characteristics affect stock 
price behavior in SEOs. Moreover, I study whether ownership characteristics affect the choice 
of issue method. The following research questions are covered: 
- Does institutional ownership affect the offer price discount in SEOs?  
- Does ownership concentration affect the offer price discount in SEOs? 
- Does institutional ownership affect the post-issue stock price performance of issuing 
companies? 
- Does ownership concentration affect the post-issue stock price performance of issuing 
companies? 
- Does institutional ownership affect the choice of issue method? 
- Does ownership concentration affect the choice of issue method? 
1.3. Contribution to existing literature 
The thesis contributes to existing literature in various ways. First of all, the thesis addresses 
the relatively limited literature on SEOs in Europe by employing SEOs from all major 
European stock exchanges.  
Secondly, the thesis provides new evidence on public issue types, including accelerated 
bookbuilt offerings, bough deals, and fully marketed offerings. One reason explaining the 
lack of empirical literature on these public issues types is the absence of a reliable issue type 
classification in the SDC database, which most previous studies have used as a source for 
data. I have had the possibility to use the Dealogic database, which has been documented to 
provide a much more accurate classification of the issue type (Gao and Ritter, 2007). For 
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example, Bortolotti et al. (2007) use the SDC classification but state that it poses a challenge 
in  the  sense  that  it  frequently  gives  multiple  designations  to  a  single  tranche.  Therefore  the  
results of this study can be considered as more accurate as to the classification of the issue 
type.  
Thirdly, I contribute to the relatively limited amount of papers on ownership characteristics in 
SEOs taking place in Europe. One reason explaining this lacking empirical evidence is the 
lack of an easily accessible ownership database. For example, in the US this type of data has 
been long available. In the thesis I use a unique set of manually handpicked data for 
ownership characteristics to study how institutional ownership and ownership concentration 
impact stock price behavior in SEOs. 
Fourthly, the thesis combines the data on issue types and ownership characteristics to 
investigate whether pre-issue institutional ownership or ownership concentration affect the 
choice between the different public offer types. This sort of analysis on pre-issue  ownership 
characteristics has not been performed previously in academic literature with data from 
Europe, even though practitioners have been aware that accelerated offers are often targeted at 
institutional investors resulting in increased post-issue institutional ownership. 
1.4. Results 
The study finds that the issue method in which the SEO is carried out in has a strong influence 
on the offer price discount. Fully marketed offerings do not require an equally high discount 
as accelerated offers, including accelerated bookbuilt offers and bought deals. This result, at 
least partly, justifies the use of fully marketed offerings, even though high out-of-pocket costs 
are incurred to the issuing company in the form of investment bank fees.  
Ownership characteristics, or changes in them, on the other hand do not have a significant 
effect on the offer price discount. However, ownership characteristics do affect the choice of 
issue method. For issuing companies with high pre-issue institutional holding an accelerated 
offer is more likely. This can be explained by these companies having a lower need to market 
the issue to potential subscribers of shares. Moreover, as accelerated offers are often targeted 
at institutional investors, it seems natural that also pre-issue institutional ownership has been 
high to begin with. On the other hand, for issuing companies with high pre-issue ownership 
concentration, fully marketed offerings are more likely, which can be explained by these 
companies having a higher need to market shares.  
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The announcement effect is statistically significant for accelerated bookbuilt offerings 
(negative) and bought deals (positive). However, after controlling for firm characteristics, the 
announcement return does not seem to be affected by the choice of issue method. Moreover, 
ownership characteristics do not seem to affect the announcement effect. 
Furthermore, post-issue institutional ownership seems to have a strong positive effect on 
long-run returns for a 24-month time period. This can be explained at least to some extent by 
the monitoring gain that institutional investors bring to companies. Also, institutional owners 
can be thought to have better stock-picking ability than the average investor. However, this 
result does not persist with a time period of 36 months, which could be caused by changes in 
institutional holding during the time period. Ownership concentration has a negative effect on 
long-run post-issue returns. This can be explained by lower float and liquidity of these 
companies, which reduce the number of attracted investors. This result is observable for the 
24 and 36-month time periods. On the other hand, changes in neither of the two studied 
ownership characteristics resulting from the offer seem to affect long-run returns. 
1.5. Limitations to the study 
The study is subject to a certain degree to certain limitations typically present in event studies. 
First of all, the data requirements employed in the study lead to the exclusion of a significant 
portion of SEOs conducted in Europe. Especially the ownership data is very limited and exists 
only since the year 2000 in Thomson Financial, making the final sample relatively small. 
Secondly, long-run event studies have been criticized for model misspecification and 
inadequate benchmarks for the measuring of abnormal returns. In this study country indices 
have  been  used  to  measure  long-run  returns,  which  to  a  certain  extent  mitigates  the  risk  of  
using an inadequate benchmark.  
1.6. Structure of the study 
The thesis is structured as follows. The second chapter presents SEOs and different offer 
types. The third chapter presents a theoretical framework for the capital acquisition process, 
including a review of the announcement effect, offer price discount, long-run 
underperformance, and ownership characteristics. The fourth chapter presents the hypotheses 
of the study. The fifth chapter presents the data and methodology used. The sixth chapter 
presents the empirical results. The seventh chapter concludes the study. The eighth chapter 
presents the references used. The ninth chapter is the appendix. 
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2. Seasoned equity offerings and different issue types 
 
This chapter provides a brief description of seasoned equity offerings. The chapter begins by 
reviewing the SEO process, the role of investment bankers in the process, and the costs 
incurred for the issuing company. Moreover, the chapter provides a description of the 
different offer types studied in the thesis, in addition to explaining rights offers. Finally, the 
chapter concludes by reviewing previous literature on different offer types.    
SEOs are an important form of equity financing for publicly listed companies. An SEO can be 
described as a sale of additional shares by a company whose shares are already publicly 
traded, and that all equity offerings occurring subsequent to an IPO can be regarded as SEOs. 
In an SEO, the issuing company sells shares to the market similarly as in an IPO. However, 
the distinction to an IPO is that in an SEO the issuing company has a public quote ex ante to 
the offering, which makes the setting of the offer price relatively easier than what is the case 
in an IPO process. Nevertheless, also in SEOs the price setting is an important factor 
contributing to the success of the SEO. Masulis and Korwar (1986) point out that common 
stock offerings have two major impacts on a firm: the increase in equity capital lowers the 
firm’s leverage, and the proceeds are generally used to finance capital expenditures. SEOs 
provide an alternative to debt financing, which is important especially for companies with 
strained balance sheets and high leverage ratios 
It is worthwhile to make a distinction between selling new (primary) shares to the public and 
selling old (secondary) shares to investors. In the former new equity is raised, whereas in the 
latter a block of old shares is sold to a new owner without new capital being raised. In this 
study secondary offerings are excluded due to their deviating nature..  
2.1. The SEO process 
The SEO process is characterized by a high degree of information disclosure – perhaps only 
in an IPO more disclosed information is required (Gibson et al. 2004). The shares issued in an 
SEO need to be sold to investors, which requires that an investment story be created. Due to 
this, the issuing company and the investment bankers the company hires carry out marketing 
efforts, including the drafting of a prospectus, a road show, and conference calls. This 
provides outside investors with the possibility to interact with the issuing company’s 
management and the investment bankers selling the issue, including their sell-side analysts. 
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2.1.1. The role of investment bankers and the importance of the order book 
The underwriting syndicate, comprising the investment banks hired to carry out the SEO 
process, has various roles in an SEO, including marketing. Typically in a public SEO, 
investment bankers try to understand the demand level of investors and influence it by 
marketing efforts such as road shows where the issuing firm is promoted and its investment 
story told. In other words, the information asymmetry between insiders and investors is 
decreased by giving easy access to already public information. According to the head of the 
Finnish office of a leading Nordic investment bank, the more time spent on this process, the 
minor is the information asymmetry and consequently the discount at which the new shares 
are sold. 
Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) study the effects of bookbuilding in international equity issues 
and describe the role of investment bankers: they conduct a preliminary analysis, choose the 
offer price, allocate the shares, and stabilize the aftermarket price. In the bookbuilding 
procedure in IPOs, the investment bank announces an indicative price range and institutional 
investors submit bids for shares. After the bookbuilding process, a demand curve is 
constructed and the issue price chosen accordingly. The investment bank relies heavily on the 
information contained in the bids when setting the price, and the bids that most influence the 
issue price are the ones which are favored in the allocation of shares. This supports the 
findings of Benveniste and Spindt (1989), who state that investors supply information in 
exchange for a more favorable allocation.  
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Spatt and Srivastava (1991) state that through bookbuilding 
the investment bank extracts information from investors which will be helpful in pricing the 
issue accurately, thus reducing the adverse selection among investors. Cornelli and Goldreich 
(2003) state that in SEOs invesment banks build a book even though there is an existing 
market price for the issuing firm’s share in situations where the stock is illiquid or the number 
of shares being issued is large relative to the shares already trading, i.e. in situations where the 
banker is concerned that the issue of additional stock might affect the market price and 
consequently cannot rely completely on the existing price. In SEOs there is no initial price 
range as is the case with IPOs, since the pre-issue market price reflects all pre-issue 
information. Nevertheless, even in SEOs where a pre-issue market price exists, there is 
information provided by investors through bookbuilding beyond the existing market price 
(Cornelli and Goldreich, 2003). 
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Benveniste and Spindt (1989) also state that in principle issuing IPO firms can collect 
premarket indications of interest without employing an underwriter. However, an underwriter 
can reduce required underpricing by selling IPOs repeatedly to the same regular investors. 
Thus it is possible to quantify the economies (in the form of higher proceeds) that can be 
realized because of the extra capacity an underwriter firm can bring to the premarketing 
process. 
Baron and Holmstöm (1980) state that investment banking syndicates have three basic 
services they offer to the issuing firm: they provide advice and councel regarding the type of 
securities to be issued, coupon rates, maturity, timing, offer price, etc; they offer an 
underwriting function by bearing some or all of the risk associated with the proceeds of the 
issue; and they provide a distribution function by selling the securities to investors. If no 
asymmetric information exists between the issuer and the bank regarding the issue price there 
is no need to use the services of the bank; however most often the bank has superior 
information as to the demand of the issue and the state of the capital market.  The information 
asymmetry may be due to the bank having private information about the demand of the 
securities through its preselling contracts with potential buyers. The investment bank wants to 
assure that the offer is  fully sold to investors and as a result  wants to set  a lower price than 
what would be optimal for the issuer. The bank faces costs when acquiring private 
information regarding the demand, and because of this it wants to limit those costs by pricing 
lower  than  the  issuer  would  like.  The  problem  for  the  issuer  is  that  it  does  not  know  what  
price would be the most optimal, which decreases its chances to impose scrutiny to the price 
the bank suggests. However, the fact that the investment banking industry is competitive 
mitigates this problem, as investment bank who continually price issues lower than the 
industry norm end up losing market share. Moreover, the problem is mitigated also if the 
issuer is financially sophisticated, i.e. it has capability to evaluate whether the price the 
investment bank sets is too low.  
Investment banks also act as certifiers in an equity issue. Asymmetric information often exists 
between the issuing company’s existing shareholders and outsiders who are potential 
subscribers to new issues. Underwriters can be employed to certify that the issue price is 
consistent with the inside information about future earnings prospects of the firm. Issuing 
firms are viewed as ‘leasing’ the brand name of an investment banker to certify that the issue 
price reflects available inside information. Smith (1986) calls the overcoming of information 
asymmetry the certification role of investment banks. Carter and Manaster (1990) use a 
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ranking for investment bank reputation to determine the influence of the banks’ prestige on 
post-IPO performance. 
2.1.2. Costs incurred in an SEO 
When investment banks are hired to underwrite and market an SEO, they expect to receive 
fees for their work. There are various factors for which investment banks are paid, including 
the underwriting risk and the marketing efforts they carry out. For the issuing company, these 
fees  often  represent  a  significant  cost.  If  the  issuing  company  chooses  to  carry  out  a  fully  
marketed offering in which shares are underwritten, the underwriting costs cannot be avoided. 
However, the fees which result from investment banks’ marketing efforts can be questioned: 
do investment banks carry out marketing which is worth the money that they receive from it? 
Marketing can help mitigate the information asymmetry problem, and thus decrease the offer 
price discount that investors demand for participating in the offer.  
The fees that investment banks charge of course depend on the circumstances in which the 
SEO is carried out. One important factor affecting the ease of marketing is the liquidity of the 
issuing firm’s stock. One would expect there to exist more information asymmetries in low-
liquidity stocks than in high-liquidity stocks, because in high-liquidity stocks more 
information is available on the company. Butler et al. (2005) report that investment banks’ 
fees are significantly lower for firms with more liquid stock. Moreover, Corwin (2003) 
reports  that  liquidity  may  also  reduce  the  underpricing  in  SEOs.  Moreover,  in  times  of  
uncertainty, the information costs and hence issuing costs in equity offerings will be higher, 
as investment banks have to spend more resources in tempting potential investors (Bhagat and 
Frost, 1986). Therefore it can be predicted that in volatile stock markets issuing shares is 
more expensive.  
Bhagat and Frost (1986) report that issuing costs in underwritten equity offerings are a 
function of the risk of the offering, the size of the offering, and information costs. The authors 
also state that there are three components to the costs of an underwritten equity offering: the 
commission paid to the investment banker(s) for providing the underwriting services; the cost 
borne by the issuing company (e.g. accounting fees, filing fees, the opportunity cost of the 
issuing firm’s management time spent in planning the offering, etc.); and the underpricing of 
the shares. The underwriting invesment bank(s) are paid for the risk they bear with a failed 
offering (Bhagat and Frost, 1986). If the offer price turns out to higher than the share price of 
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the issuing company on the day of the offer, the underwriter bears an unexpected loss from 
their compensation because the new shares cannot be sold at their original issue price. 
It is believed that there are economies of scale in issuing new stock (Bhagat and Frost, 1986). 
Hansen and Pinkerton (1982) suggest that equity offerings include fixed costs such as legal 
and accounting fees, registrar’s fees, and overhead costs such as printing and engraving costs. 
As the issue size increases, the average fixed costs decrease. However, the increased risk 
associated with very large issues may more than offset the diminishing effect of economies of 
scale and average costs may begin to increase (Bhagat and Frost, 1986). 
2.2. SEO issue methods 
SEOs can be arranged by different methods. Gao and Ritter (2007) rely on categorization 
used by the Dealogic database, and state that the three major issue types are fully marketed 
offers, accelerated offers, and rights offers. They also state that they have found the Dealogic 
database to be more accurate with filing dates and more consistent with its classification of 
the offer method compared to the SDC database. According to the Dealogic classification, 
fully marketed offers and accelerated offers are public offers, in which shares are offered to 
the public in general (i.e. not only to current shareholders). Accelerated offers can be divided 
into accelerated bookbuilt offers and bought deals. As opposed to public offers, in rights 
offers  shares  are  sold  to  existing  shareholders.  Table  1  provides  an  illustration  of  different  
offer types, their target market, and the speed in which they are conducted.  
Table 1: SEO offer types 
The table presents selected SEO offer types, their target markets, and the illustrative relative speed of the offer. 
 
The issue type can practically be categorized in an as detailed manner as one chooses, but for 
the purposes of this study I will not go into a more detailed description. An example of a more 
detailed categorisation is the study by Eckbo and Masulis (1995). In the article alternative 
methods for floating seasoned common stock are studied, including firm commitment offers, 
best  effort  offers,  rights  offers  with  standby  underwriting,  direct  issues  (e.g.  to  security  
holders of acquired firms), and private placements.  
Offer type Target market Speed of offer
Accelerated bookbuilt offering Shares sold to the public Fast
Bought deal Shares sold to the public Fast
Fully marketed offering Shares sold to the public Slow
Rights offer Shares sold to existing shareholders Fast or slow
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2.2.1. Public issues 
In a public offer shares are sold to investors in general, and not only to existing shareholders 
of the issuing firm. In contrast to rights offerings, the ownership by existing shareholder can 
be subject to dilution because shares are sold to new investors in addition to existing ones. In 
order to protect current shareholder rights, in many European countries like Finland, the 
issuing company needs the approval of 2/3 of shareholders in the annual general meeting to 
carry out the public offering. Public offerings include fully marketed offerings, accelerated 
bookbuilt offerings, and bought deals. These are presented next. 
Fully marketed offer 
In a fully marketed SEO, the issuing company chooses an investment bank(s) to market the 
offer and set the price. The process resembles a bookbuilt IPO, because the investment bank  
hired to carry out the offering gathers information about investors’ demand and builds an 
order book, which is used to help determine the offer price. The marketing function of the 
investment bank usually includes a road show, in which the issuer’s management and the 
investment bankers meet with institutional investors, analysts, and securities sales personnel 
over a two week period. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the fully marketed process.  
Figure 1: Fully marketed offering process 
The table presents a simplified illustration of the fully marketed offering process. Based on Gao and Ritter, 2007 
 
Bought deal 
In  a  bought  deal,  the  issuing  firm  announces  the  amount  of  stock  it  wishes  to  sell  and  
investment banks bid for these shares. The bank that offers the highest net price wins the deal, 
Selection of bookrunner and co-
managers
Preparation of preliminary 
prospectus
Registration
Marketing, road show and 
bookbuilding
Announcement of the filing
Trade begins
Actions by the issuing company / 
investment bank
Actions as how they are perceived 
by the market
Usually 2-3 weeks
Time period
Issuing of final prospectus, 
pricing and allocation
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and then re-sells the shares on the open market or to its investors, usually within 24 hours 
(Gao and Ritter, 2007). Often bought deals are used as a means to sell equity to institutional 
investors (Bortolotti et al., 2007). Afer the issue is bought by the winning investment bank, 
there are no further obligations on the part of the issuer (Eckbo and Masulis, 1995). This issue 
method is seen as a way for relatively unknown investment banks to compete for underwriting 
mandates. Figure 2 provides an illustration of the bougth deal process.  
Figure 2: Bought deal process 
The table presents a simplified illustration of the bought deal process. Based on Gao and Ritter, 2007 
 
Accelerated bookbuilt offer 
In accelerated bookbuilt offers banks do not initially purchase the whole issue from the 
issuing company, but rather submit proposals where they specify the gross spread but not 
necessarily an offer price, for the right to underwrite the sale of shares. The winning bank 
then usually forms a small underwriting syndicate and begins marketing the shares to 
investors. Similarly to bought deals, often the target audience consists of institutional 
investors. The offer price is then negotiated between the issuing firm and the bank. No road 
show is conducted and the underwriting procedure is completed typically within 48 hours. 
Figure 3 provides an illustration of the accelerated bookbuilt offering process.  
  
Investment banks submit bids 
after the close of trading
Bank that offers the highest net 
price wins
Registration
Re-selling of shares
Announcement of the filing
Trade begins
Actions by the issuing company / 
investment bank
Actions as how they are perceived 
by the market
Usually overnight
Time period
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Figure 3: Accelerated bookbuilt offering process 
The table presents a simplified illustration of the accelerated bookbuilt offering process. Based on Gao and 
Ritter, 2007 
 
2.2.2. Rights offers 
In  a  rights  offer,  current  shareholders  are  given  short-term  warrants  on  a  pro  rata  basis,  
allowing them to either purchase the new shares with the warrant or to sell the warrant in the 
market before expiration (typically 20 days). Unsubscribed shares are offered to shareholders 
who wish to purchase more shares than their pro rata share of the issue – this being called the 
overallotment  option  (Eckbo  and  Masulis,  1995).  Theoretically,  in  a  rights  offer  the  issuer  
could increase the offer price discount until the offer would be guaranteed to succeed 
(because current shareholders could in all cases capture the full value of the rights by either 
exercising the warrant or by selling it in the secondary market). However, in practice issuers 
often hire an underwriter to guarantee the proceeds on any unsubscribed shares, due to issues 
such as asymmetric information. This sort of rights issues are commonly known as rights with 
standby underwriting. Other forms of rights issues also exist. In a best efforts offer, the issuer 
bears the risk of the offer failing whereas the investment bank solely acts as a marketing 
agent. In a firm commitment offer on the other hand the investment bank bears the risk of the 
issue by guaranteeing the proceeds and bearing the responsibility for selling the shares to the 
market. In the US rights offerings have been surprisingly uncommon, especially when taking 
into account the issue costs which tend to be lower for rights offers than for public offers. In 
Europe, on the other hand, rights offers are a popular way of raising equity. 
2.3. Empirical studies on different issue methods 
Most of the studies that deal with the choice of issue method focus on the choice between 
public and rights offerings. Studies on the choice between different public offer types have 
Selection of bookrunner
Registration
Accelerated bookbuilding
Pricing and allocation
Announcement of the filing
Trade begins
Actions by the issuing company / 
investment bank
Actions as how they are perceived 
by the market
Usually 1-2 days
Time period
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been relatively uncommon. As Gao and Ritter (2007) point out, there is no theoretical or 
empirical treatment of the choice between public offer types, such as between accelerated 
offers and fully marketed offers. This is peculiar, as the volume of accelerated offers has been 
increasing in recent years after emerging in the 1990s. Before this, the SEO market was 
dominated by fully marketed offerings (Gao and Ritter, 2007). Bortolotti et al. (2007) find 
that in 2004, more than a third of issues outside of the US were accelerated offers. Moreover, 
the fraction of accelerated offers has since increased to over half the value of US SEOs and 
over two-thirds of European SEOs. The authors also find that accelerated deals have become 
more popular because they are faster and cheaper than fully marketed offerings. Moreover, 
the authors find that in Europe the mean underpricing for accelerated offers has amounted to 
2.97%, with the figure for non-accelerated offers being 7.32%1.  The  authors  classify  
accelerated bookbuilt offerings, bought deals, and block trades as accelerated offers.  
As to the choice between rights and public cash offerings, Rinne and Suominen (2009) use 
European data and develop a model in which the major determinants of the choice are the 
over and undervaluation of shares and the price impact from selling shares in the market. The 
price impact is lower for public equity offerings than for rights issues, as in the former the 
investment bank managing the offer can lower the offer price discount throught its marketing 
efforts.  Moreover,  rights  offers  are  more  likely  when the  shares  of  the  issuing  company are  
undervalued, supporting previous empirical findings that public offers are common in times 
of overvaluation.  
Wu (2004) examines the impact of information asymmetry and monitoring of managers on 
the choice between public offerings and private placements. The author finds that private 
placement firms are characterised by higher information asymmetry than firms conducting 
public offerings. Therefore public offerings can be considered as a more likely alternative for 
firms facing information asymmetry. Moreover, monitoring by investors in private 
placements does not exceed monitoring by investors in public offerings, casting doubt on the 
view that private placements are motivated by a demand for enhanced monitoring.  
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) develop an analytical framework to explain firms’ choice of equity 
flotation method and the near disappearance of rights offers by US exchange-listed firms. The 
authors state that the choice of issue method between uninsured rights, rights with standby 
                                                             
1 The authors include offers on public as well as private markets. Moreover, the authors do not apply a minimum 
deal size for their data selection process. These factors at least partly contribute to the relatively high level of 
underpricing compared to results found in other previous studies.  
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underwriting, and firm-commitment underwriting depends on information asymmetries, 
shareholder characteristics, and the direct flotation costs. The authors state that a possible 
explanation for the declined popularity of rights offers is that important shareholder-borne 
costs of this method have been ignored or underestimated, including capital gain taxes, 
transaction  costs  of  selling  rights  in  the  secondary  market,  and  wealth  transfers  due  to  anti-
dilution clauses.   
Smith (1977) reports that even though rights offerings involve significantly lower costs, 
underwriters are employed in over 90 percent of the offerings covered in the study. The 
author  states  that  the  arguments  which  explain  the  use  of  underwriters  (that  are  present  in  
public offerings) are insufficient to justify the additional costs that arise from the use of them. 
Smith (1977) hypothesizes that firms nevertheless use underwritten offerings to raise capital 
because they provide the managers of the issuing firms with perquisites that are absent in 
rights offers. Moreover, whereas a rights issue is unlikely to change the distribution of voting 
shares substantially, a sale to the public through an underwriter can increase shareholder 
dispersion, thereby reducing shareholder monitoring of managers and thus enhancing 
potential manager welfare.  
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3. Theoretical framework 
 
This  chapter  highlights  the  most  relevant  theories  related  to  SEOs.  The  first  section  
concentrates  on  traditional  theories  of  capital  structure.  The  second  section  presents  the  
theories regarding the announcement effect in SEOs, the third section the theories on the offer 
price discount, and the fourth section the theories relating to the long-run underperformance 
following the issue. Finally, the fifth section describes the role of ownership structure in 
SEOs.  
3.1. Capital structure considerations 
3.1.1. Irrelevance of capital structure 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) famously present the idea of the irrelevance of capital structure. 
Without market imperfections capital structure should not matter, and the value of a company 
should not be affected whether the company issues equity, debt, or hybrid financing. 
Therefore,  when  a  company  issues  equity  in  a  SEO,  the  share  price  should  not  be  affected  
assuming that the issue announcement does not convey any additional information related to 
firm prospects. However, in reality market imperfections do exist: transaction costs, taxes, 
asymmetric information, and bankruptcy costs play a role in financial decisions that 
companies  face.  Moreover,  companies  are  not  necessarily  able  to  borrow at  a  risk-free  rate,  
like the Modigliani-Miller model assumes. Most importantly, companies can benefit from 
additional leverage in the form of tax advantages as interest payments are tax deductible; but 
keeping in mind that potential financial distress costs limit the amount of debt a company can 
take.  
3.1.2. Static and dynamic trade-off theories of capital structure 
Trade-off theories of capital structure take into account market imperfections, including taxes 
and bankruptcy costs. The static trade-off theory states that companies have an optimal capital 
structure, which is a trade-off between the interest tax shield achieved from high leverage, and 
the costs of financial distress (e.g. Myers, 1984). The dynamic trade-off theory was developed 
to explain the deficiencies in the static trade-off theory (e.g. Barnea et al., 1987). It states that 
the optimal capital structure can be achieved by adjusting the debt-to-equity ratio, but that it is 
not always optimal to make these adjustments immediately after a deviation from the optimal 
target  structure,  but  only  when the  costs  of  adjustment  are  lower  than  the  costs  of  having  a  
suboptimal capital structure (Leary and Roberts, 2005). According to the dynamic trade-off 
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theory,  companies  gradually  adjust  towards  their  optimal  capital  structures.  Both  the  static  
and dynamic trade-off theories suggest that raising equity through a SEO does not convey 
negative information about the company, but that issuing companies are merely moving 
towards their optimal capital structures. 
3.1.3. Pecking order theory 
Introduced by Myers (1984), the pecking order theory is based on the assumption that a 
company’s managers and investors are subject to asymmetric information. The managers of a 
company are more aware of the company’s true value, including growth prospects and risk. 
Managers are more willing to use retained earnings to finance investment because in this way 
they do not face scrutiny from investors to the same extent as if they would issue debt or 
equity. This is because debt can be raised without board approval (in general), whereas equity 
cannot (in general). Moreover, taxes and transaction costs favor funding investments with 
retained earnings and debt over issuing equity. Raising equity can also convey negative 
information  to  investors:  an  equity  issue  can  be  considered  as  a  sign  that  the  stock  is  
overvalued. Because of this, firms adjust their dividend policies to anticipate future 
investment needs. However, due to reluctance to change dividend policy constantly and 
changes in cash flow and investment requirements, retained earnings might be more or less 
than the investment needs. Consequently excess cash will be used to pay off debt prior to 
repurchasing shares; and if external financing is needed firms issue the safest security first 
(i.e. first straight debt, then convertibles, and only finally equity if necessary). Eckbo and 
Masulis (1995) report supporting evidence about corporate funding sources: according to the 
authors internal equity has remained the dominant funding source for US nonfinancial 
corporations, and that debt dominates equity as an external funding source.  
3.2. Announcement effect of SEOs 
According to Eckbo and Masulis (1995), the main theoretical arguments for valuation effects 
of SEOs are based on adverse selection and signaling effects associated with information 
asymmetries, agency costs of free cash flow, wealth transfers between classes of security 
holders, as well as moral hazard problems in lowering managerial stock ownership.  
3.2.1. Free cash flow hypothesis 
The free cash flow hypothesis states that market participants react negatively to SEO 
announcements, because an SEO increases the resources and likelihood for poor investments 
by managers. In other words, when managers have ample free cash flow, they will waste it on 
negative-NPV projects, consequently destroying firm value. The theory predicts that as long 
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as there is only a limited number of positive-NPV projects available, issuing firms will 
experience a decline in operating performance following the offering.  
3.2.2. Adverse selection 
Studies which discuss theories of how the announcement of a SEO conveys negative 
information to the market include Myers and Majluf (1984), Miller and Rock (1985), and 
Lucas and MacDonald (1990). The theories presented in these papers assume that firm 
managers have inside information about earnings prospects and investment opportunities. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) state that rational investors believe that firm managers are willing to 
issue  equity  when  they  believe  that  the  shares  of  their  companies  are  overvalued.  Firm  
managers act on the interests of existing shareholders, who gain if overvalued stock is issued 
to new shareholders. Thus rational investors perceive an SEO announcement as a sign that the 
issuing firm’s stock is overvalued, which leads to a negative announcement effect. Miller and 
Rock (1985) state that companies issue new equity when they have the need to compensate 
low earnings. Therefore investors react to the announcement of a SEO negatively.  
3.2.3. Downward sloping demand curve 
At least Asquith and Mullins (1986), Gao and Ritter (2007), Benveniste and Spindt (1989), 
Miller (1977) and Merton (1987) have covered the theory that a negative share price response 
to SEOs may be caused by a downward-sloping demand curve of the issuing firm’s stock. 
According to an efficient market assumption, demand curves for stocks are horizontal. Market 
prices reflect all available information and the prices are determined based on expected risk 
and return because close substitutes for a particular stock are always available with similar 
characteristics. Therefore the changes in supply and demand for any particular stock should 
not alter the stock price. However, empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case. 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) assume that no exact substitutes exist for a particular stock, 
consequently making the demand curve downward-sloping and not horizontal. Thus, in a SEO 
when new shares are issued, the price of the issuing firm’s stock decreases regardless of the 
information content of the equity issue. 
3.2.4. Empirical evidence on the announcement effect 
Various  empirical  studies  performed with  US data  on  SEO announcement  report  significant  
negative SEO announcement returns. However, evidence from studies which use data from 
other markets is mixed, and do not ambiguously prove that SEO announcements would be 
related to negative announcement returns. 
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Table 2 pools together some of the empirical evidence regarding the announcement effect. As 
can be seen, studies which use US data have reported more significant announcement returns. 
Especially the studies by Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and Kalay and Shimrat (1987) stand 
out with negative returns of -3.6% and -3.4% respectively.  
Table 2: Empirical findings on announcement returns 
The table summarizes some of the main findings in the area of SEO announcement returns. All studies employ 
either [-1,0] or [-1,1] as the event window.   
 
Studies conducted with data outside of the US have been relatively uncommon until recently. 
However, it can be seen that these studies have reported announcement returns which have 
been  less  negative  than  the  ones  carried  out  with  US  data.  For  example,  Gajevsky  and  
Ginglinger (2002), study French public offers and find that the announcement effect is 
negative but statistically insignificant.  
3.3. SEO underpricing and offer price discount 
Some papers make a distinction between underpricing and the offer price discount in SEO 
literature. A usual definition for underpricing is the percent change between the offer price 
and the following day’s price, whereas the offer price discount is usually defined as being the 
percent  change  between  the  closing  price  on  the  day  prior  to  the  offer  and  the  offer  price.  
However, often underpricing and discounting in SEOs are used interchangeably. 
3.3.1. Value uncertainty 
Corwin (2003) finds that SEO underpricing is positively related to the level of uncertainty 
about firm value. New investors must be compensated for the information asymmetry they 
Study Issuer type Sample size Sample period Market Abnormal return
Asquith and Mullins (1986) All 392 1963-81 US -3.0%
Masulis and Korwar (1986) All 972 1963-80 US -3.3%
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) All 80 1972-82 US -3.6%
Kalay and Shimrat (1987) All 455 1070-82 US -3.4%
Dierkens (1991) All 197 1980-83 US -2.4%
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) All 1,057 1963-80 US -2.0%
Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) Industrial 1,456 1963-83 US -3.2%
Denis (1994) All 435 1977-90 US -2.5%
Bethel and Krigman (2004) All 2,592 1992-01 US -2.0%
Heron and Lie (2004) All 3,658 1980-98 US -2.5%
D'Mello, Schlingemann, and Subramaniam (2009) All 1,621 1982-95 US -1.9%
Slovin, Sushka, and Lai (2000) All 296 1986-94 UK -1.4%
Barnes and Walker (2006) All 868 1989-98 UK -0.3%
Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002) All 215 1986-96 France -0.8%
Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) All 199 1986-99 Sweden 5.4%
Wu, Wang, and Yao (2005) All 405 1989-97 Hong Kong 1.9%
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face – when a SEO is underpriced investors purchase the shares at a lower price than what the 
market price is (Parsons and Raviv 1985, among others). Rock (1986) develops a model in 
which underpricing is necessary to compensate uninformed investors and thereby ensure their 
participation in the new issue market. Beatty and Ritter (1986) further demonstrate that the 
winner’s curse problem results in a positive relation between underpricing and ex ante 
uncertainty about the value of the issue. Corwin (2003) finds that underpricing is positively 
related  to  offer  size,  price  uncertainty,  and  pre-offer  return.  The  author  also  states  that  
underpricing is specifically related to the relative issue size, with the effect being most 
pronounced for securities hypothesized to have relatively inelastic demand. Altinkilic and 
Hansen (2003) decompose the SEO discount into expected and unexpected components and 
find a positive relationship between discounting and value uncertainty. Corwin (2003) finds 
that underpricing is related to the concurrent level of underpricing in the IPO market. Kim and 
Shin (2004) also document that ex ante uncertainty and SEO discounts are positively related. 
3.3.2. Manipulative trading 
Various papers have studied the impact of SEC’s Rule 10b-21 in 1988, which imposes 
restraints to the covering of short sales using shares from SEOs. Prior to the adoption of the 
rule,  it  was a popular belief that  traders sought short  positions in the premarket for SEOs to 
drive down the offer price, and in the offer purchased shares to cover the short position. For 
example, Kim and Shin (2004) find that the imposing of the rule makes discounts larger after 
the 1990s, as pre-offer prices became less informative, as presented by Gerard and Nanda 
(1993). Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) also examine Rule 10b-21 and its effect on short-
selling activities around SEOs, but find no evidence that it would have increased underpricing 
(their study period however already ends in 1991). 
3.3.3. Clustering of prices 
Mola and Loughran (2004) report that offer prices are clustered at integers, and that both IPOs 
and SEOs priced at integers are subject to more underpricing. This leads to the conclusion that 
investment bankers with highly regarded analysts have the power to set the price in a way that 
they leave money on the table for their favored clients. Corwin (2003) and Christie and 
Schultz (1994) also explain underpricing with rounding conventions. 
3.3.4. Price pressure 
Corwin (2003) documents that price pressure is an important determinant in underpricing. 
Price pressure can be seen as similar to the theory of the downward sloping demand curve 
presented earlier. When the supply of shares is permanently increased in an SEO, the demand 
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for the shares should decrease, assuming that the demand curve is downward sloping. 
Alternatively, if the SEO is viewed as a temporary liquidity shock that must be absorbed by 
the market, a discount is necessary to compensate investors for absorbing the additional 
shares. Corwin (2003) finds that specifically underpricing is positively related to the relative 
offer size (which is linked to the relative amount of price pressure induced), especially for 
companies with relatively inelastic demand. 
3.3.5. Insurance against legal liability 
Loderer et al. (1991) state that the legal-liability hypothesis related to IPOs presented by 
Ibbotson (1975) and Tinic (1988) can explain underpricing in SEOs as well. The hypothesis 
states that underpricing can provide insurance against legal liability and the associated 
damages to investment bankers’ reputations. Underwriters underprice new issues as a cheap 
way of lowering the probability that the price will fall after the issue, which reduces the 
likelihood of legal action by unsatisfied buyers.  
3.3.6. Analyst coverage 
Bowen et al. (2008) find analyst coverage to affect underpricing in SEOs by reducing 
asymmetric information between market participants. The authors state that because analysts 
can increase investors’ awareness of and knowledge about a firm and presumably reduce 
information asymmetry among investors, analyst coverage should lower the cost of raising 
equity capital (ceteris paribus). However, various papers regarding IPOs, such as Cliff and 
Denis (2004), Aggarwal et al. (2002), Chen and Ritter (2000), and Rajan and Servaes (1997) 
show that underpricing is positively related to the likelihood and amount of subsequent 
analyst coverage. This is explained by IPO underwriters having the possibility to leave money 
on the table in the form of underpricing (which the underwriters can allocate to their favored 
clients) when they are able to provide analyst coverage for the issuing company. For example, 
James and Karceski (2006) report that underwriter-affiliated analysts provide protection in the 
form of “booster shots” of stronger coverage if the issuing IPO firm experiences poor 
aftermarket stock performance. 
3.3.7. Empical evidence on the offer price discount 
The empirical evidence on the offer price discount consists mainly of studies which use data 
from the US. For example, Bortolotti et al. (2007) state that no single study provides 
systematic evidence on SEO underpricing in European issues. This can partly be explained by 
the  popularity  of  rights  offers  in  Europe,  in  which  the  offer  price  discount  is  of  lesser  
importance since the discount ends up in the pockets of existing shareholders and thus does 
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not provoke such great concern. From Table 3 it can be seen that the offer price discount has 
increased over time. Corwin (2003) reports that while underpricing averaged only 1.15% in 
the 1980s, it has risen to 2.92% in the 1990s. Mola and Loughran (2004) report that the 
amount of money left on the table in SEOs averaged $7.1 million in 1999, compared to $0.5 
million in 1986. Consequently the interest for understanding the drivers for underpricing has 
increased. Bortolotti et al. (2007) find in their extensive study that accelerated offers have 
been characterized by lower discounts in the US, Europe, and globally. 
Table 3: Empirical findings on discounting in SEOs 
The table summarizes some of the main findings in the area of the SEO offer price discount. 
 
3.4. Long-run underperformance following the SEO 
Various academic papers document long-run underperformance of SEO companies following 
the issue, compared to benchmark indices. Assuming efficient markets, long-run 
underperformance should not be possible, as the information content of the SEO should be 
reflected immediately in the share price of the issuing company. 
3.4.1. Lower systematic risk 
Eckbo et al. (2000) explain that lower post-SEO stock returns are caused by lower systematic 
risk exposure for issuers relative to comparable non-issuers. When new equity is raised, the 
leverage of the issuing company decreases and consequently lowers exposure to unexpected 
inflation and default risk. Subsequently investors should require a lower risk premium for 
investing in the company, reflecting in a lower required rate of return.   
Study Issuer / issue type Sample size Sample period Market Discounting
Smith (1977) All 328 1971-75 US 0.5%
Bhagat and Frost (1986) Utilities 552 1973-80 US 0.7%
Loderer, Sheehan, and Kadlec (1991) All 1,600 1980-84 US 1.4%
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) Industrial 401 1963-81 US 0.4%
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) Utilities 656 1963-81 US 0.3%
Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) All 474 1980-91 US 0.5%
Kim and Shin (2004) All 1,017 1983-88 US 1.3%
Kim and Shin (2004) All 2,287 1988-98 US 3.0%
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) All 1,703 1990-98 US 3.0%
Corwin (2003) All 4,454 1980-98 US 2.2%
Mola and Loughran (2004) All 4,814 1986-99 US 3.0%
Kim and Park (2005) All 1,040 1989-00 US 3.5%
Bortolotti, Megginson, and Smart (2007) Non-accelerated 6,363 1991-2004 US 2.5%
Bortolotti, Megginson, and Smart (2007) Accelerated 243 1991-2004 US 1.8%
Huang and Zhang (2009) All 2,281 1995-04 US 3.2%
Bortolotti, Megginson, and Smart (2007) Non-accelerated 13,738 1991-2004 Global 4.9%
Bortolotti, Megginson, and Smart (2007) Accelerated 2,531 1991-2004 Global 3.0%
Bortolotti, Megginson, and Smart (2007) Non-accelerated 3,160 1991-2004 Europe 7.3%
Bortolotti, Megginson, and Smart (2007) Accelerated 2,119 1991-2004 Europe 3.0%
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3.4.2. Behavioural models 
Various studies relate long-run underperformance to behavioural models, as opposed to more 
conventional theories such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model or the Fama-French three 
factor model. Behavioural models assume that investors do not always act rationally and that 
they are characterized by limited computational power.  
For example, Barberis et al. (1998) explain long-run underperformance of SEO firms with a 
model where investors belong to one of two possible earnings regimes. The first type of 
investors assume earnings to revert to the mean, i.e. that quarterly changes in earnings are 
temporary and that earnings will gradually adjust back to their normal level sooner or later. 
The second type of investors believe that earnings follow either an upward or downward 
sloping trend. Moreover, investors are reluctant to change the regime they belong to. 
Consequently, investors are first slow to react to surprises in earnings levels. Once in the 
second regime, inventors will under react to the negative news related to an SEO 
announcement, as they expect earnings to continue increasing despite the temporary bad 
news. This leads to the market price not fully reflecting the negative news relating to the SEO 
announcement, and therefore to long-run underperformance.  
Long-run underperformance has also been explained by investors’ overconfidence. For 
example, Daniel et al. (1998) present a model where investors are characterized by 
overconfidence as they overweight private information and underweight public information in 
their investment decisions. The authors’ model predicts that signals supporting investors’ 
prior beliefs will cause continued miss valuation, and that only after some time public 
information will correct this miss valuation and pull valuations towards equilibrium.  
3.4.3. Window of opportunity and market timing 
Various papers (e.g. Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Choe et al., 1993; Hickman, 1953) claim that 
SEO companies underperform after the issue because they have taken advantage of transitory 
windows of opportunity by issuing equity when shares have been overvalued. Also, Lucas 
and McDonald (1990) state that equity issues are common following general market rises. 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) state that firms tend to issue equity when market values are high 
and repurchase shares when valuations are low. This market timing based explanation states 
that the pre-issue stock price run-up reflects the divergence of the stock price from 
fundamentals, and causes companies to issue equity at these times. As the divergence from 
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fundamentals does not last forever, in the long-run share prices of issuing companies come 
down.  
3.4.4. Earnings management 
Some studies explain long-run underperformance of issuing firms by earnings management. 
Earnings are artificially increased before the offering to attract investors. However, in the 
longer run the issuing company cannot reach the earnings levels investors had presumed 
before the offer, which results in underperformance. Teoch et al. (1998) finds evidence that 
manipulation of earnings before the SEO partially explains both earnings underperformance 
and stock return underperformance. Rangan (1998) also finds that earnings management 
explains the decline in earnings and stock returns.  
3.4.5. Affiliated analysts 
Dechow et al. (2000) finds that analysts affiliated with the issuing SEO company release more 
overly optimistic earnings growth estimates than unaffiliated analysts (non-affiliated analysts 
also release overly optimistic estimates). This results in long-run underperformance as the 
issuing company does not reach the anticipated level of the analyst releases. Moreover, the 
authors document that post-issue underperformance is more severe for firms with the highest 
long-run growth estimates made by affiliated analysts. 
3.4.6. Poorly specified statistical model 
Some studies have criticized papers documenting long-run underperformance by SEO 
companies, stating that inappropriate statistical models have been applied when computing 
returns. Conrad and Kaul (1993) report that when using cumulated one-month returns over 
time returns are upwards-biased over long time intervals. Moreover, Barber and Lyon (1997) 
and Kothari and Warner (1997) study the aggregation of returns, and find similar biases. 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) report that traditional buy-and-hold return calculation assumes 
independence of multi-year abnormal return: after taking into account cross-correlation of 
returns, the authors find only little evidence of underperformance for SEO firms. Fama (1998) 
argues that observed long-run underperformance is caused by model misspecification.  
3.4.7. Empirical evidence on long-run underperformance 
Table 4 shows that long-run underperformance of SEO issuers takes place. Most of the 
studies on this topic employ the buy-and-hold methodology, and test a time period of 3-5 
years. Moreover, most studies use matching firms as benchmark, and this way take into 
account the effect of size and market-to-book ratio of the tested firms. To simplify, it can be 
said that the longer the measured time period, the greater the underperformance. There does 
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not seem to be great difference between geographical markets as to underperformance. The 
only study in the table below which does not report this phenomenon is by Eckbo et al. 
(2007), that is when the authors test the underperformance of financial companies.  
Table 4: Empirical findings on post-issue buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
The table summarizes some of the main findings in the area of SEO post-issue returns. The studies employ the 
buy-and-hold abnormal return methodology, and use either matching firms or portfolios of matching firms as 
benchmarks. 
 
Study Issuer type Sample size Sample period Market Holding period BHAR
Loughran and Ritter (1995) All 3,702 1970-90 US 36 months -33.0%
Loughran and Ritter (1995) All 3,702 1970-90 US 60 months -59.4%
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) All 1,247 1975-89 US 36 months -22.8%
Lee (1997) All 1,513 1976-90 US 36 months -20.3%
Jegadeesh (2000) All 2,992 1970-93 US 60 months -34.3%
Brav, Geczy, and Gombers (2000) All 3,775 1975-92 US 60 months -26.3%
Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) Industrial 3,851 1964-95 US 60 months -23.2%
Kahle (2000) Industrial 1,739 1981-1992 US 36 months -14.7%
Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) Industrial 4,971 1980-00 US 60 months -29.7%
Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) Financial 655 1980-00 US 60 months 0.0%
Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) Utilities 659 1980-00 US 60 months -19.1%
Suzuki (2000) All 826 1991-96 UK 18 months -15.1%
Ho (2005) All 627 1989-97 UK 36 months -19.5%
Ngatuni, Capstaff, and Marshall (2007) All 818 1986-95 UK 60 months -32.1%
Andrikopoulos (2009) All 1,542 1988-98 UK 36 months -26.2%
Cai and Loughran (1998) All 1,389 1971-92 Japan 60 months -41.7%
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3.5. SEOs and ownership structure 
Studies on the role of ownership structure in SEOs has been relatively limited, at least when 
compared to the literature on IPOs and institutional owners [see e.g. Aggarwal et al. (2002), 
Benveniste et al. (1989), Rock (1986), and Chemmanur and Hu (2006)]. Studies on ownership 
structure have focused on various aspects, including institutional holding, insider holding, 
management holding, ownership concentration, changes in ownership characteristics; and 
how these affect the pricing of the issue, the announcement effect, long-run returns, and 
operational performance. Next will follow a description of the studies which concentrate on 
the influence of ownership structure around the issue and on post-issue returns.  
3.5.1. The influence of ownership structure around the issue date 
Eckbo and Norli (2004) use Norwegian data and study valuation changes around SEO 
announcements and ownership structure. The authors study ownership concentration 
(percentage of shares held by the ten largest shareholders) and insider ownership (percentage 
of  shares  held  by  the  CEO  and  the  members  of  the  board  of  directors).  The  authors  fail  to  
reveal a significant influence for ownership concentration on SEO announcement period 
returns, but state that insider holding is positively related to the announcement return. 
However, D’Mello et al. (2009) use US data to find that announcement returns are positively 
and significantly associated with institutional ownership concentration, and also with 
institutional ownership levels. 
Chemmanur et al. (2009) point out that the information possessed by institutional investors 
will be reflected in pre-offer market prices and trading volume in SEOs, which issuers can 
potentially use to set the offer price. Institutional investors possess private information about 
SEOs, and additionally they produce information about SEO firms. Issuers choose the SEO 
discount in equilibrium balancing the desire to maximize SEO proceeds against the need to 
minimize the risk of SEO failure, at the same time ensuring that institutional investors have an 
adequate incentive to produce information about the firm. The existence of a pre-offer market 
gives  rise  to  the  SEO discount,  i.e.  the  fact  that  the  offer  price  is  set  on  average  below the  
closing price on the previous day. The authors find for their US sample that larger 
institutional SEO allocations are associated with smaller SEO discounts. Chemmanur et al. 
(2009) also present the idea that institutional investors can manipulatively trade against their 
private information in the pre-offer market, and in this way try to increase the offer price 
discount. However, the authors do not find empirical evidence to support this hypothesis.  
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Moreover, institutional owners can exert high control and monitoring on the companies they 
own (Gao and Mahmudi 2008), and thus can be assumed to hold more information on these 
companies. Consequently they do not need to be provided with information to the same extent 
as is the case with individual investors, which should be reflected in a lower discount.  
Huang and Donghang (2009) use pre-issue institutional ownership as a proxy for the ease of 
marketing for their sample of US SEOs, since the new shares of an SEO are often placed with 
institutional investors. Also, managing investment banks have an easier task in promoting the 
offer when they only have a limited audience to approach. Placing shares to institutional 
holders can be hypothesized as being easier if more institutional owners are already familiar 
with the stock. Thus the volume of institutional ownership should be negatively related to the 
offer price discount in an SEO. 
Slovin et al. (2000) study valuation effects of announcements of SEOs in the UK, and report 
that placings, which increase ownership dispersion, generate significantly positive share price 
effects, whereas rights offerings have large negative valuation effects. The authors conclude 
that the option to conduct placings enhances the ability of firms to signal their quality and to 
use SEOs to reduce ownership concentration.  
Intintoli and Kahle (2010) use US data to study SEO underpricing and suggest that higher 
discounts are partially due to temporary price pressure in recent IPOs with thin public float 
(the shares outstanding that are available for trading by the public). In other words, ownership 
concentration causes higher discounts. Moreover, the authors study the effect of insider 
ownership on underpricing, and state that insider ownership reduces float, thereby increasing 
price pressure and underpricing.  
3.5.2. The influence of ownership structure on post-issue returns 
Empirical studies on the ownership structure on long-run returns often concentrate on issues 
relating to the monitoring of companies. For example, at least Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
and Zeckhauser and Pound (1990), document that shareholders with large stakes in firms have 
a greater ability and incentive to monitor the firm’s management. Large shareholders are 
typically institutional investors, such as pension or mutual funds that hold significant fractions 
of the firms’ stock. They have a comparative advantage in monitoring managers due to 
several reasons. Managers are typically more receptive to their demands because they hold 
large blocks of the company. Furthermore, they have greater incentives for monitoring since 
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they cannot always sell the shares of underperforming firms, possibly fearing adverse price 
movements from trading their large holdings.  
Also, institutional investors have economies of scale when acquiring information about the 
firm (D’Mello et al., 2009), which should lead to increased stock-picking ability. Institutional 
ownership also draws attention from analysts: O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) find that more 
analysts follow the stocks of firms that have larger institutional interest. This should lead to 
higher returns as more information is created of the company in question hence increasing the 
number of potential investors. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) find that equity value is positively related to the firm’s 
institutional shareholdings. More specifically, the authors find a positive relation between the 
Tobins Q measure, a ratio comparing the market value of a company's stock with the value of 
a company's equity book value, and the fraction of shares owned by institutional investors.  
Gibson et al. (2004) investigate whether institutional investors possess an information 
advantage over individual investors, and whether institutional investors are able to separate 
potentially overperforming SEO firms from potentially underperforming SEO firms. The 
authors find that SEOs in which institutional holdings increase around the time of the offer 
outperform their benchmark portfolios. The authors test the possibility that results are caused 
by a size effect, i.e. institutions merely buying a larger share of large-firm SEOs (Falkenstein, 
1996 and Gompers and Metrick, 2001 find that small stocks exhibit greater post-issue 
underperformance than large stocks), but find no evidence of the size effect being the 
explanation for institutional investors’ stock-picking ability. 
Chemmanur et al. (2009) use transaction-level institutional trading data to determine whether 
institutions  posses  and  are  able  to  exploit  their  private  information  in  SEOs.  They  find  that  
institutions are able to identify and obtain more allocations in SEOs with better long-run stock 
returns,  trade  in  the  same  direction  as  their  private  information  and  that  their  post-SEO  
trading significantly outperforms a naïve buy-and-hold trading strategy. 
Relating to IPOs, Field (1995) finds that those IPOs with high institutional ownership 
performed better over a subsequent three-year period than those with little or no institutional 
ownership. Moreover, Krigman et al. (1999) finds that IPOs with heavy institutional first-day 
selling perform the worst in the following year, consistent with the hypothesis that institutions 
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either possess information unavailable to individual investors or make better use of publicly 
available information. 
D’Mello et al. (2009) find that post-issue stock returns and changes in operating performance 
are positively and significantly related to contemporaneous changes in total institutional 
ownership and the concentration of their shareholdings for SEOs taking place in the US. The 
authors explain the results with the monitoring hypothesis, and eliminate the argument that 
the findings are the result of institutional investors possessing superior information which 
would result in better stock-picking ability; and the argument that institutional investors 
would merely be buying past winners and selling past losers.  
Gao and Mahmudi (2008) use US data to examine the monitoring benefits of institutional 
ownership in SEOs. The authors find that firms with larger institutional holdings have better 
SEO  outcomes,  tend  to  issue  a  smaller  size  of  equity,  and  are  more  likely  to  complete  
announced SEO deals. 
Kothare (1997) finds that rights issues in the US are costlier for issuing firms than public 
issues, because the former lead to a more concentrated ownership structure and thus reduce 
the liquidity of the issuer’s stock. In other words, changes in spreads are correlated with 
changes in the concentration in share ownership around the issuance of equity. Also, the 
author finds that trading volume increases significantly following public issues, but not after 
rights issues. Therefore liquidity changes around stock offerings can influence the firm’s 
choice of issue method. Kothare (1997) uses three measures of ownership concentration: 
insider holdings (shares owned by the CEO, chairperson, directors, and other senior officers 
of the company), beneficial or block ownership (ownership of shareholders holding 5% or 
more of the firm’s equity), and the number or shareholders. 
Moreover, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) argue that stocks with larger spreads have higher 
required rates of return and lower value because investors require compensation for higher 
expected trading costs. In other words, investors require compensation for buying illiquid 
firms. Holmström and Tirole (1993) argue that concentrated ownership reduces the extent to 
which market participants monitor the firm, reducing the amount of information available 
about the firm and increasing spreads and value. 
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4. Development of hypothesis 
 
This chapter presents the key hypotheses in the study. The hypotheses are mainly based on the 
previous literature presented earlier. Hypotheses 1-3 relate to the offer price discount, 
hypotheses 4-6 to long-run post-issue returns, and hypotheses 7-8 to the choice of issue 
method.  For  the  announcement  effect,  no  explicit  hypotheses  are  presented,  but  the  results  
concerning it are nevertheless presented in chapter 5. 
Hypothesis 1a: High pre-issue institutional ownership decreases the offer price discount. 
Since the new shares in an SEO are often placed with institutional investors, a high 
institutional ownership increases the ease of marketing and selling shares. Institutions gain 
information through the monitoring of companies (Chen et al.), and therefore institutional 
investors do not have to be tempted to invest via a high discount (to the same extent as, say, 
individual investors, who do not possess as much private or public information about the 
issuing company). Moreover, institutional investors participating in the offer will have 
contributed to the bookbuilding process, hence providing the issuing firm and its investment 
banker with knowledge regarding the demand, as found by Chemmanur et al. (2009). This 
eases the price setting as more is known of the market’s demand for new shares, and the 
discount will not be needed to be set at a high level. 
Hypothesis 1b: Increasing institutional ownership from the issue decreases the offer price 
discount. 
The change in institutional ownership in this study results from the SEO – thus it cannot 
directly be said that this would affect the discount (as the discount is set before the change in 
institutional ownership has taken place). However, the change in holding can be used as a 
proxy for the level of institutional allocation (which is known before the discount is set), 
which has been found by Chemmanur et al. (2009) to lower the discount.  
Hypothesis 2a: High pre-issue ownership concentration increases the offer price discount. 
Intintoli and Kahle (2010) suggest that higher discounts are partially due to price pressure 
resulting from low liquidity. Therefore ownership concentration, which decreases stock float 
and  liquidity,  should  cause  the  discount  to  be  higher.  Moreover,  investors  may  need  to  be  
compensated to invest in illiquid stock. 
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Hypothesis 2b: Increasing ownership concentration from the issue increases the offer price 
discount. 
Again, the change in ownership concentration cannot directly be said to affect the discount (as 
the discount is set before the change in ownership concentration has taken place). However, if 
the investment bank arranging the offer anticipates through bookbuilding that ownership 
concentration will be increased in the offer, the discount may need to be set higher in order to 
compensate investors for purchasing illiquid stock.  
Hypothesis 3: An accelerated offer increases the offer price discount. 
The marketing process preceding the issue helps in decreasing asymmetric information 
between market participants (e.g. Rinne and Suominen, 2009; Huang and Zhang, 2009).  
Moreover, the bookbuilding process preceding the offer helps in gaining knowledge on the 
demand level of the market, which can be utilized to set the discount at an appropriate level. 
In accelerated offers, including accelerated bookbuilt offers and bought deals, this period is 
shorter compared to fully marketed offers. Therefore accelerated offers should require a 
higher discount. 
Hypothesis 4a: High post-issue institutional ownership increases long-run post-issue returns. 
It can be argued that institutional investors have the ability to pick stocks better than 
individual investors due to issues such as economies of scale in acquiring information 
(D’Mello et al., 2009) – thus they subscribe shares in an SEO if they believe that the shares 
are undervalued. Also, institutions can exert power in and monitor companies where they 
have large holdings. E.g. Gao and Mahmudi (2008) find that firms with larger institutional 
holdings have better SEO outcomes due to monitoring benefits. Thus high post-issue 
institutional ownership should lead to higher returns.  
Hypothesis 4b: Increasing institutional ownership from the issue increases long-run post-
issue returns. 
If institutional investors are characterized by superior stock-picking ability as presented by 
Gibson et al. (2004), they will subscribe to shares in SEOs where they believe that the issuing 
company has a positive outlook. Moreover, increasing institutional ownership will lead to 
higher monitoring power. Therefore the increase in institutional ownership should lead to 
higher returns.   
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Hypothesis 5a: High post-issue ownership concentration decreases long-run post-issue 
returns. 
High ownership concentration decreases float and liquidity, and in this way is costly for firms 
(Kothare, 1997).  Moreover, concentrated ownership reduces the extent to which market 
participants monitor the firm, reducing the amount of information available about the firm and 
consequently firm value as the number of potential investors decreases (Holmström and 
Tirole, 1993). Therefore high ownership concentration should lead to lower returns.  
Hypothesis 5b: Increasing ownership concentration from the issue decreases long-run post-
issue returns. 
As a firm’s ownership concentration increases, so does its float and liquidity, which have an 
adverse effect on firm value, as presented in the hypothesis 5a. Therefore increasing 
ownership concentration should lead to lower returns.  
Hypothesis 6: An accelerated offer increases long-run post-issue returns. 
Companies carrying out accelerated offers usually do not need to market themselves, which 
can be seen as a sign of quality. Moreover, carrying out fully marketed offerings is costly for 
the issuing firm due to high out-of-pocket costs. Therefore companies conducting accelerated 
offers should face higher returns.  
Hypothesis 7: High pre-issue institutional ownership increases the likelihood of an 
accelerated offer. 
Accelerated offers should be common with companies with high institutional holding, since 
these investors do not require an equally exhausting marketing process as is the case with 
retail investors (as stated in hypothesis 1a). Moreover, as accelerated offers are often targeted 
at institutional investors, it could be the case that already before the offer the institutional 
holding is high. 
Hypothesis 8: High pre-issue ownership concentration decreases the likelihood of an 
accelerated offer. 
Accelerated offers should be uncommon with companies with high ownership concentration, 
since these issues require a higher discount (as stated in hypothesis 2a) and thus a longer 
marketing process.  
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Table 5: Summary of hypotheses 
The table pools together the presented hypotheses. Hypotheses 1-3 relate to the offer price discount, hypotheses 
4-6 to long-run post-issue returns, and hypotheses 7-8 to the choice of issue method. 
  
Hypothesis
Offer price discount
H1a High pre-issue institutional ownership decreases the offer price discount
H1b Increasing institutional ownership from the issue decreases the offer price discount
H2a High pre-issue ownership concentration increases the offer price discount
H2b Increasing ownership concentration from the issue increases the offer price discount
H3 An accelerated offer increases the offer price discount
Long-run returns
H4a High post-issue institutional ownership increases long-run post-issue returns
H4b Increasing institutional ownership increases long-run post-issue returns
H5a High post-issue ownership concentration decreases long-run post-issue returns
H5b Increasing ownership concentration decreases long-run post-issue returns
H6 An accelerated offer increases long-run post-issue returns
Choice of issue method
H7 High pre-issue institutional ownership increases the likelihood of an accelerated offer
H8 High pre-issue ownership concentration decreases the likelihood of an accelerated offer
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5. Data and methodology 
 
This chapter introduces the data collection process and methodology used, in addition to 
presenting selected sample characteristics.  
5.1. Construction of the sample 
The data used in this study includes SEOs from the Dealogic database carried out in Europe 
during the years 2000-2005. Offers below EUR 10m have been excluded. Additionally, pure 
secondary offerings and rights offers have been excluded due to their deviating nature from 
public offers. Moreover, offers where the company has not existed in Thomson Financial and 
companies for which share price data has not been found on Datastream have been excluded. 
If the company has not been directly found from Thomson Financial by a code, it has been 
attempted to find manually before deleting it from the sample. Thus it can be said that it is 
very unlikely that companies which actually would have existed in Thomson Financial would 
have been left out the sample in vain.  
Many studies regarding SEOs have examined whether multiple equity issues from one 
company have an impact on results. E.g. Bayless et al. (2005) study separately samples of 
SEOs with and without multiple issuers, but come to the conclusion that the results regarding 
abnormal returns around SEOs are not materially different from each other. Therefore 
multiple issuers have not been removed from the sample.  
The data is unique in the sense that for all the companies still remaining in the sample at the 
stage of the ownership search, a manual process has been required to hand-pick the ownership 
characteristics before and after the issue date. Offers for which ownership data has not been 
available of Thomson Financial have been excluded from the sample. The ownership data has 
been collected by first looking at the situation at the fiscal quarter ending before the SEO for a 
specific company, and secondly the situation at the end of the fiscal quarter ending after the 
offer. Two characteristics have been collected: the fraction of shares held by institutional 
investors and the concentration of ownership. The concentration of ownership has been 
calculated by computing the fraction of shares that the ten largest investors of the company 
hold, similarly to e.g. how Eckbo and Norli (2004) calculate ownership concentration. 
Regarding the classification of investors into institutional and non-institutional, the following 
classification used by Thomson Financial has been applied. 
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Table 6: Classification of investors 
The table presents which investors are classified as institutional investors in the thesis, and which are classified 
as non-institutional investors. Based on the classification of Thomson Financial. 
 
After excluding companies with the above-mentioned criteria, a sample of 364 SEO 
companies is left. The data relies on the classification used by the Dealogic data for the issue 
type, including accelerated bookbuilt offerings, bought deals and fully marketed offerings.  
Share price data has been obtained from Datastream. Certain firm characteristics which have 
been used for control purposes, including share turnovers, share price volatilities, market-to-
book ratios, market capitalizations, and profitability levels have been collected from Thomson 
Financial and have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Other control variables have 
been collected from the Dealogic database, and include take-up levels, relative offer sizes, and 
the times from the last equity issues for the SEO companies. Table 7 presents the sample 
collection process. 
  
Non-institutional investors
Investment managers, incl. Funds, incl. Brokerage firms, incl. Corporations
Banks and trusts Mutual funds Independent research firms Government agencies
Endowment funds Hedge funds Other research firms Holding companies
Finance companies Individual investors (incl. households)
Investment foundations
Government investment agencies
Insurance companies
Investment advisors
Pension funds
Private equity funds
Sovereign wealth funds
Venture capital funds
Institutional investors
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Table 7: Construction of sample 
The table presents the sample construction process and the sample size left in each stage. 
 
5.2. Methodology 
The study employs mean and median tests, in addition to OLS regression, to analyze the offer 
price discount, announcement returns, and long-run returns. For the choice of issue method, 
logit regression is applied. 
5.2.1. Offer price discount 
The offer price discount in an SEO is defined as being the percent change between the price 
on the last trade prior to the offer and the offer price. The offer price discount for each 
security i is defined as: 
???? = ?????????? ? 100     (1)
  
where: 
???  is the market value of the of security i on the last trade before the offer 
???  is the offer price of the SEO 
Thus it is slightly different from the definition used in many previous papers, where the offer 
price discount is usually defined as being the percent change between the closing price on the 
day prior to the offer and the offer price. The definition used in this study is more accurate in 
the sense that it uses the most recent available data before the offer, and not the closing price 
on the day before the offer.  
Sample size
SEOs in Europe in Dealogic database announced between January 2000 and December 
2005 with issue size exceeding EUR 10m
2 649
Pure secondary offerings 1 144
Rights issues 346
Companies which do not exist in Thomson Financial 151
Companies with no available stock price data on Datastream 470
Companies where ownership data is not found in Thomson Financial 174
Sample left 364
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5.2.2. Announcement effect 
For the announcement effect, firm specific cumulative abnormal stock returns are calculated. 
More  specifically,  stock  returns  adjusted  for  stock  splits  and  dividends  are  compared  to  
country specific market indices. For each security i the daily abnormal stock return is defined 
as: 
???? = ??? ?  ???      (2) 
 where: 
??? is the daily return on the SEO firm i on day t 
??? is the daily return on the benchmark index over the same time period 
? = 0 is the announcement date of the SEO 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated for the two-day time period starting one 
day before the announcement of the offer and ending on the announcement day of the offer: 
????(??, ??) = ? ??????????      (3) 
Moreover, the equally weighted cumulative average abnormal return is calculated for 
securities i = 1 … n  
??????????(??, ??) = ??? ????(???? ??, ??)    (4) 
5.2.3. Long-run returns 
For post-issue returns, buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are calculated. The BHAR for 
a specific security is defined as: 
????? ,? =  ? ?1 + ??,?? ? ? ?1 + ??,??????????????    (5) 
5.2.4. OLS regressions and robustness check 
OLS regressions are carried out for the offer price discount, announcement returns, and long-
run returns. For the OLS regressions, a robustness check is conducted to measure the 
significance of the year 2000 in the models, when the dot-com era was still ongoing. In the 
regression models which check the robustness, the year 2000 has been excluded from the 
sample. Should the results stay similar to the models where the year 2000 is included, the 
results can be considered robust.  
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The OLS regressions for the dependent variable Y are specified as: 
?? =  ?? + ????? ??+ ????? + ??    (6) 
where: 
??,??, … ,?? are independent variables 
In  a  sample  of  n observations on variables ?,??,??, … ,??the OLS regression is used to fit 
the equation 
?? =  ?? + ????? ??+ ????    (7) 
where values for coefficients ??, ??, … , ?? are fitted so that the residuals’ sum of squares are 
minimized.  
Additionally, the OLS regressions are tested for that no alarming levels of heteroscedasticity 
or autocorrelation take place. 
5.2.5. Mean and median tests 
Mean and median tests are used to test differences in subgroups of the sample for the offer 
price discount, announcement returns, and long-run returns. For the mean, the one-sided 
student t-test is used; and for the median the Wilcoxon signed rank test is used. The Wilcoxon 
signed rank test is used in addition to the student t-test, as the former does not assume 
normally distributed error terms, which can potentially be the case with the tested subgroups. 
Hence it provides a complementary method to test the subgroups where the assumption of 
normally distributed error terms does not need to be fulfilled. 
The t-statistic for the student t-test, which is used to calculate the p-value, is defined as: 
? = ????????
?(???)/???        (8) 
where: 
??????? is the sample mean 
?(???) is the sample standard deviation 
n is the number of observations in a given sample 
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The z-statistic for the Wilcoxon signed rank test is defined as: 
? = ???(?)
??
      (9) 
where: 
?(?) = ?(???)
?
      
??
? = ?(? + 1)(2? + 1)24  
while ?(?) and ??? refer to sample expected value of ranked deviations’ sum and variance of 
ranked deviations respectively. Under the assumption that the subsamples are drawn from the 
same distribution, z-statistics follow a normal distribution. 
5.2.6. Logit regressions 
To test the likelihood of an accelerated offering taking place as opposed to a fully marketed 
offerings, logit regression is applied. Logit estimation with more than one explanatory 
variable hypothesizes that the probability of a given occurrence is determined by the function: 
?? = ?(?)? = ???????     (10) 
where: 
?? =  ?? + ????? ??+ ????? 
5.3. Sample characteristics 
Table 8 below presents the number of SEOs and proceeds raised by offer type for the years 
2000-2005. It can be seen that the most common offer type has been bought deals (155 
offerings), followed by accelerated bookbuilt offerings (145 offerings). Fully marketed 
offerings on the other hand have not been as common (64 offerings). It can be seen that fully 
marketed offerings have been a relatively common offer type still in 2000, but in the 
following years accelerated offers have been of more importance. Moreover, the total number 
of SEOs and the amount of proceeds raised has been relatively high in 2000, but decreased 
sharply in 2001. This can partly be explained by the collapse of the dot-com era in 2000, after 
which companies opted not to raise as much equity as during the dot-com era due to lower 
share price valuations. Approaching 2005 however the total number of SEOs and proceeds 
raised started increasing again.   
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Table 8: SEO volumes 
The table presents the number of SEOs and proceeds raised for the whole sample and by offer type and year. 
 
Figures 4 and 5 below present the number of SEOs by country and industry, based on the 
classification used by the Dealogic database. It can be seen that nearly half of the SEOs have 
been conducted in the UK. This is natural when considering the dominant position of the 
London Stock Exchange in Europe for companies to list their shares. Other major economies, 
including Germany and France, are also represented in the sample with a relatively high 
importance. It is interesting to note that Finland, albeit being a rather small economy in 
Europe, ranks seventh in the number of SEOs in the sample. Moreover, certain large 
economies such as Spain and Italy are represented with only a few SEOs, which can partly be 
explained with the relatively minor role of stock markets in these countries. Furthermore, it 
can be seen that the industry with the most SEOs has been computers & electronics. This can 
partly be explained by the inclusion of the year 2000 in the sample, when IT firms conducted 
equity offerings. Other industries represented with a relatively high amount of SEOs include 
finance and healthcare.  
  
Year Number
Total proceeds 
(EUR m) Number
Total proceeds 
(EUR m) Number
Total proceeds 
(EUR m) Number
Total proceeds 
(EUR m)
All 364 100,876 145 65,106 155 10,072 64 25,697
2000 66 23,639 9 1,407 23 4,893 34 17,338
2001 31 13,040 16 6,538 6 171 9 6,331
2002 41 13,685 23 11,918 13 425 5 1,341
2003 47 17,299 20 16,628 25 636 2 35
2004 67 13,229 28 11,364 31 1,550 8 315
2005 112 19,984 49 17,251 57 2,396 6 337
Fully marketed offeringsAll SEOs Accelerated bookbuilt offerings Bought deals
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Figure 4: SEOs by country 
The table presents the number of SEOs in the sample by country. The horizontal axis represents the number of 
SEOs. 
 
Figure 5: SEOs by industry 
The table presents the number of SEOs in the sample by industry, as reported by the Dealogic database. The 
horizontal axis represents the number of SEOs. 
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6. Results 
 
This  chapter  covers  the  empirical  results  of  the  study,  including  results  regarding  the  offer  
price discount, announcement effect, post-issue returns and choice of issue method. 
6.1. Offer price discount 
The offer price discount for the SEOs in the sample vary significantly depending on the offer 
type. Figure 6 below shows the median and mean offer price discounts for each studied offer 
type. Figures for individual years are not presented due to a low number of data points for 
certain deal types in certain years. As can be seen, fully marketed offerings have been 
characterized by the lowest median and mean discounts. Accelerated bookbuilt offerings have 
experienced the highest discounts on average – however when measured by the median 
bought deals have suffered from the highest discounts. The average figures vary somewhat 
from the mean figures, indicating that among the sample there are at least some SEOs with 
extremely high discounts.  
Figure 6: Median and mean offer price discounts by offer type 
The table presents the median and mean offer price discounts for each offer type. ABB refers to accelerated 
bookbuilt offerings, BD to bought deals, and FMO to fully marketed offerings. 
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The observation that fully marketed offerings have faced the lowest discounts can also be 
seen from the Table 9, where statistical tests for the mean and median have been conducted on 
sample subgroups.  First  of all,  the figures indicate that the discount for all  three offer types 
has been different from zero at a statistically significant level. Secondly, the difference 
between the mean discount for fully marketed offerings and accelerated offerings (including 
accelerated bookbuilt offerings and bought deals) has been -4.18%, statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The difference in the medians is a somewhat smaller -1.09%, but nevertheless 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  
Similar tests have also been conducted for subgroups based on pre-issue ownership 
characteristics and changes in ownership characteristics. Again, as can be expected, the 
discounts for all the subgroups has been different from zero at a statistically significant level. 
In the subgroups based on pre-issue ownership characteristics there is not significant 
difference between the groups. In other words, pre-issue institutional ownership nor pre-issue 
ownership concentration do not significantly affect the offer price discount. The difference in 
the mean discount between the subgroup with above-median pre-issue institutional ownership 
and the subgroup with below-median pre-issue institutional ownership is 1.01%. Moreover, 
the difference in the mean discount between the subgroup with above-median pre-issue 
ownership concentration and the subgroup with below-median pre-issue ownership 
concentration is -0.23%. Neither of these is statistically significant.  
For subgroups based on changes in ownership characteristics, some differences arise. The 
difference in the mean discount between the subgroup with above-median increase in 
institutional ownership and the subgroup with below-median increase in institutional 
ownership is -1.50%. In other words, increasing institutional ownership has been 
accompanied with a lower discount. However, this result is significant at only the 10% level. 
Moreover, the difference in the mean discount between the subgroup with above-median 
increase in ownership concentration and the subgroup with below-median increase in 
ownership concentration is -1.65%. In other words, increasing ownership concentration has 
been accompanied with a lower discount. This results is also significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 9: Offer price discount for sample subgroups 
The table presents the mean and median offer price discounts for sample subgroups based on issue method (panel A), pre-issue ownership characteristics (panel B), and 
changes in ownership characteristics resulting from the issue (panel C). ABB refers to accelerated bookbuilt offerings, BD to bought deals, and FMO to fully marketed 
offerings. For ownership characteristics, the 4th quartile  has  the  most  and the  1st quartile the least of the variable in question. The one-sided student t-test represents the 
statistical significance for the mean differing from zero for all columns except for the ones which measure difference. For the columns which measure difference, the one-
sided student t-test represents the statistical significance for the means for the two subgroups in question differing from each other, whereas the Wilcoxon signed rank test 
represents the same for the medians. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
Panel A: Issue method
Mean -4.18% 9.79% 8.36% 4.87% 9.05%
Median -1.09% 4.55% 5.89% 3.57% 4.65%
One-sided student t-test p-value <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 ***
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.05 **
Panel B: Pre-issue ownership characteristics
Mean 1.01% 8.82% 7.81% 8.91% 8.72% 6.69% 8.93%
Median 0.00% 4.65% 4.65% 4.65% 4.65% 3.73% 5.10%
One-sided student t-test p-value 0.17 <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 ***
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.85
Mean -0.23% 8.20% 8.43% 7.18% 9.21% 8.71% 8.14%
Median 0.00% 4.65% 4.65% 4.65% 5.06% 4.65% 4.65%
One-sided student t-test p-value 0.41 <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 ***
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.97
Panel C: Changes in ownership characteristics
Mean -1.50% 7.56% 9.07% 8.40% 6.72% 6.26% 11.87%
Median -0.21% 4.58% 4.79% 4.65% 4.44% 4.55% 5.92%
One-sided student t-test p-value 0.07 * <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 ***
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.10 *
Mean -1.65% 7.49% 9.14% 7.92% 7.06% 7.47% 10.80%
Median -0.17% 4.59% 4.76% 4.44% 4.65% 4.65% 5.88%
One-sided student t-test p-value 0.06 * <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 ***
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.05 *
Accelerated
(ABB and BD)
Difference
(FMO vs. accelerated) ABB BD FMO
2nd quartile
Difference 
(above vs. below median) Above median Below median 4th quartile
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For a more thorough investigation of the offer price discount, regression analysis has been 
applied. Table 10 presents the results from OLS regressions in ten models. Models 1a and 1b 
test all variables jointly. Models 2a and 2b test the influence of the offer type. Models 3a and 
3b test the influence of ownership characteristics, including pre-issue characteristics and 
changes in them. Models 4a and 4b test pre-issue ownership characteristics. Models 5a and 5b 
test changes in ownership characteristics. All models employ selected control variables. The 
models labelled with “a” represent the whole data sample, whereas the models labelled “b” 
exclude the year 2000. 
The results indicate that the discount in fully marketed offerings has been lower than that in 
accelerated offerings, as hypothesised in H3. This results is consistent in all the tested 
regression models at the 1% level, including the models where the year 2000 has been 
excluded as a robustness check to mitigate the influence of the dot-com era ongoing still in 
2000. Therefore it can be said that H3 is accepted. This result contradicts the finding of 
Bortolotti et al. (2007), who find that accelerated offers suffer to a lesser extent from 
underpricing than non-accelerated offers. However, the classification of accelerated offers 
used by Bortolotti et al. (2007) is somewhat different than the one used in the thesis. 
The regressions provide weak evidence that pre-issue institutional ownership is associated 
with higher discounts (significant at the 5% level in models 4a and 4b; and at the 10% level in 
models 3a and 3b). Also, increasing ownership concentration seems to be associated with 
lower discounts (significant at the 10% level in models 3a and 3b). These two findings 
contradict hypotheses H1a and  H2b.  Moreover,  the  regressions  do  not  provide  evidence  that  
pre-issue ownership concentration or changes in institutional ownership would have an 
impact on the offer price discount. All in all, the hypotheses H1a, H1b, H2a, and H2b which deal 
with ownership characteristics affecting the offer price discount are thus rejected. 
Certain control variables have been included in the models, including the take-up level in the 
offer, the six-month share-price run-up preceding the offer, the turnover of the issuing 
company’s shares (which acts as a proxy for liquidity), the volatility of the issuing company’s 
shares, the market-to-book ratio of the issuing company’s equity, the relative offer size, the 
market capitalisation of the issuing company, and the profitability level of the issuing 
company (measured by the EBIT margin). Out of these variables, pre-issue stock price 
volatility, the relative offer size and the market capitalization of the issuing firm before the 
offer all have a positive effect on the offer price discount. Especially the relative offer size in 
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influential, being significant at the 1% level in all models. This supports the findings of 
Corwin (2003), who also finds that  underpricing is positively related to the relative offer size. 
The regression models provide a relatively good fit, with r-squared figures ranging from 0.21 
to 0.27. As can be assumed, the models with more included independent variables (e.g. 
models 1a and 1b) provide a better fit than the ones which test only certain variables (e.g. 
models 4a, 4b, 5a, and 5b). Furthermore, the highest r-squared figures are derived from the 
models which include the offer type as an independent variable, which again proves that this 
has an important influence on the discount. 
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Table 10: OLS regressions on offer price discount 
The table presents the results from the OLS regressions. The models labeled with an “a” represent the whole data sample, whereas the models labeled with a “b” represent the 
whole data sample excluding the year 2000. The dependent variable is the offer price discount in the SEO. The independent variables are as follows: FMO is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the offer is a fully marketed offer, and 0 otherwise. BD is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the offer is a bought deal, and 
0 otherwise. PREINST is the fraction of shares held by institutional investors before the offer. PRECONC is the fraction of shares held by the ten largest shareholders before 
the offer. CHANGEINST is the change in institutional ownership measured as the %-point difference from before the offer to after the offer. CHANGECONC is the change 
in ownership concentration measured as the %-point difference from before the offer to after the offer. TAKEUP is the fraction of new shares subscribed in the offer by 
existing shareholders. 6MRUNUP is the cumulative index adjusted abnormal return during the six months before the announcement of the offering. TURNOVER is the 
average monthly trading volume divided by the amount of shares from the 12 months before the announcement of the offering. VOLA is the 6-month volatility of daily 
returns before the announcement of the offering. MB is the market-to-book ratio 5 days before the announcement of the offering. RELSIZE is the proceeds of the issue 
divided by the total market value 5 days before the announcement of the offering. MARKETCAP is the natural logarithm of the total market value of the issuing company 5 
days before the announcement of the offer. EBITMARGIN is the EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) margin of the issuing company in the year of the offer. *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 
Model
Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif.
FMO -0.05 -4.28 *** -0.06 -3.65 *** -0.06 -5.03 *** -0.07 -4.37 ***
BD -0.04 -2.10 ** -0.05 -2.04 ** -0.04 -2.15 ** -0.05 -2.07 **
PREINST 0.03 1.32 0.04 1.53 0.04 1.68 * 0.05 1.78 * 0.05 2.06 ** 0.06 2.12 **
PRECONC -0.07 -1.15 -0.08 -1.04 -0.09 -1.41 -0.11 -1.43 -0.03 -1.50 -0.03 -1.49
CHANGEINST -0.03 -0.41 -0.05 -0.55 -0.03 -0.40 -0.03 -0.32 -0.08 -0.99 -0.08 -0.88
CHANGECONC -0.11 -1.58 -0.09 -1.11 -0.12 -1.87 * -0.13 -1.72 * -0.05 -1.15 -0.05 -0.79
TAKEUP 0.05 0.69 0.06 0.71 0.04 0.62 0.06 0.78
6MRUNUP -0.01 -1.15 -0.02 -1.19 -0.01 -1.36 -0.02 -1.44 -0.01 -1.40 -0.02 -1.68 * -0.01 -1.24 -0.02 -1.52 -0.01 -1.76 * -0.03 -1.89 *
TURNOVER -0.01 -1.37 -0.01 -1.60 -0.01 -1.17 -0.01 -1.44 -0.01 -1.56 -0.01 -1.73 * -0.01 -1.55 -0.01 -1.87 * -0.01 -1.22 -0.01 -1.42
VOLA 0.05 2.16 ** 0.07 2.15 ** 0.05 1.97 ** 0.06 1.83 * 0.05 2.04 ** 0.07 2.03 ** 0.05 2.13 ** 0.07 1.94 * 0.04 1.69 * 0.06 1.71 *
MB 0.00 1.31 0.00 1.54 0.00 1.43 0.00 1.74 * 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.96 0.00 1.02
RELSIZE 0.16 5.97 *** 0.16 5.76 *** 0.15 5.81 *** 0.16 5.60 *** 0.13 4.97 *** 0.13 4.60 *** 0.12 4.64 *** 0.12 4.33 *** 0.12 4.74 *** 0.12 4.40 ***
MARKETCAP 0.00 2.64 *** 0.00 1.63 0.00 3.26 *** 0.00 2.42 ** 0.00 2.31 ** 0.00 1.56 0.00 1.92 * 0.00 1.36 0.00 2.71 *** 0.00 1.95 *
EBITMARGIN -0.02 -1.46 -0.01 -0.81 -0.02 -1.65 -0.01 -1.05 -0.01 -1.05 -0.01 -0.63 -0.01 -1.13 -0.01 -0.73 -0.01 -1.13 -0.01 -0.67
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 364 298 364 298 364 298 364 298 364 298
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.21
(3a)(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)(4a) (5a)(1a) (2a)
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6.2. Announcement effect  
The announcement returns for the SEOs in the sample vary somewhat depending on the offer 
type. Figure 7 below show the median and mean announcement returns for each studied offer 
type. Figures for individual years are not presented due to a low number of data points for 
certain deal types in certain years. As can be seen, bought deals have experienced the most 
positive announcement returns. The two other offer types on the other hand have experienced 
negative announcement returns – however for fully marketed offerings both the median and 
mean has been virtually 0%. For the whole sample, the median announcement return has been 
-0.55% while the mean announcement return has been +0.22%. These returns are somewhat 
less than has been reported in previous literature, especially with studies conducted with data 
from the US. 
Figure 7: Median and mean announcement CAR by offer type 
The table presents the median and mean announcement returns (CAR) for each offer type, employing the [-1,0] 
event window. ABB refers to accelerated bookbuilt offerings, BD to bought deals, and FMO to fully marketed 
offerings. 
 
Figure 8 below shows the cumulative abnormal returns for 45 days before and after the 
announcement of the offer. It can be seen that the announcement reaction varies somewhat for 
the different issue types, and that the reaction for the sample as a whole is relatively small 
around the announcement date. For the whole sample it can be seen that there is a rise in 
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valuation during the 45 days preceding the offer, and that after the offer the valuation remains 
relatively stable with the rise halting. Accelerated bookbuilt offerings experience negative 
changes in valuation immediately before the announcement of the SEO. However, after this 
the valuation remains relatively stable. Bought deals exhibit positive changes in valuation up 
to five days before the offering, with the positive trend continuing throughout the 45 days 
time period after the announcement. The valuation changes around the offer date for fully 
marketed offerings on the other hand is somewhat unclear.  However, it can be seen that the 
trend before the announcement of the offer is positive, and becomes negative thereafter.  
Figure 8: Valuation changes (CAR) around the announcement date 
The table presents valuation changes (CAR) for each offer type around the announcement of the SEO. ABB 
refers to accelerated bookbuilt offerings, BD to bought deals, and FMO to fully marketed offerings. The 
horizontal axis represents the days before and after the announcement, with 0 being the announcement day. 
 
Table  11  presents  statistical  tests  for  the  mean  and  median  on  sample  subgroups.  It  can  be  
seen that regarding the offer type, bought deals experience positive announcement returns 
which are statistically significant at the 1% level, while accelerated bookbuilt offerings 
exhibit negative announcement returns which are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Fully  marketed  offerings  on  the  other  hand  do  not  experience  statistically  significant  
announcement returns.  
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Moreover, it can be seen that bought deals have experienced announcement returns which are 
different from the subgroup formed from bought deals and fully marketed offerings. The 
difference in the means has been 1.94%, and the difference in the medians 1.64%, both 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
As  to  ownership  characteristics,  none  of  the  formed  subgroups  based  on  above  and  below-
median institutional ownership, ownership concentration; and above and below-median 
changes in these, experience statistically significant announcement returns. Moreover, there 
does not seem to be any difference between the subgroups either. The differences in the 
means and medians between the above and below-median subgroups are close to zero and not 
statistically significant. 
Thus is can be said that the issue method has an effect on the announcement return up to 
certain extent, while ownership characteristics, or changes in ownership characteristics, do not 
affect the announcement return.  
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Table 11: Announcement effect for sample subgroups 
The table presents the mean and median announcement CARs of the SEOs for the event window [-1,0] for sample subgroups based on issue method (panel A), pre-issue 
ownership characteristics (panel B), and changes in ownership characteristics resulting from the issue (panel C). ABB refers to accelerated bookbuilt offerings, BD to bought 
deals, and FMO to fully marketed offerings. For ownership characteristics, the 4th quartile has the most and the 1st quartile the least of the variable in question. The one-sided 
student t-test represents the statistical significance for the mean differing from zero for all columns except for the ones which measure difference. For the columns which 
measure difference, the one-sided student t-test represents the statistical significance for the means for the two subgroups in question differing from each other, whereas the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test represents the same for the medians. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 
 
Panel A: Issue method
Mean 1.94% -0.86% 1.33% -0.02% -0.61%
Median 1.64% -1.41% 0.61% -0.08% -1.03%
One-sided student t-test p-value <0.01 *** 0.05 ** 0.01 ** 0.49 0.08 *
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value <0.01 ***
Panel B: Pre-issue ownership characteristics
Mean -0.35% 0.05% 0.39% -0.16% 0.26% 0.21% 0.58%
Median 0.00% -0.55% -0.55% -0.54% -0.60% -0.04% -0.62%
One-sided student t-test p-value 0.32 0.46 0.22 0.41 0.36 0.38 0.23
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.84
Mean -0.35% 0.04% 0.40% 0.04% 0.05% 0.82% -0.03%
Median 0.26% -0.35% -0.61% -0.45% -0.28% -0.54% -0.79%
One-sided student t-test p-value 0.31 0.46 0.23 0.48 0.47 0.17 0.48
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.91
Panel C: Changes in ownership characteristics
Mean -0.04% 0.20% 0.24% 0.26% 0.14% -0.43% 0.91%
Median -0.05% -0.58% -0.53% -0.45% -0.69% -0.62% 0.42%
One-sided student t-test p-value 0.48 0.35 0.32 0.37 0.42 0.24 0.13
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.92
Mean 0.31% 0.38% 0.06% 0.95% -0.19% -0.11% 0.24%
Median 0.10% -0.48% -0.59% 0.25% -0.82% -0.66% -0.04%
One-sided student t-test p-value 0.33 0.22 0.45 0.13 0.35 0.44 0.37
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.65
ABB and FMO
Difference
(BD vs. others) ABB BD FMO
2nd quartile
Difference 
(above vs. below median) Above median Below median 4th quartile
Above median Below median 4th quartile 3rd quartile 1st quartile
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For a more thorough investigation of the announcement returns, regression analysis has been 
applied. Table 12 on the following page presents results from OLS regressions. From the 
models it can be seen that the issue being a bought deal has a positive effect on the 
announcement return. However, this result is significant at the 10% level in only two of four 
models in which the variable has been included. Moreover, it can be seen that the issue being 
a fully marketed offering does not have an impact on the announcement return.  
From the models it can also be seen that pre-issue ownership characteristics do not have an 
effect on the announcement return, as was already noted in the mean and median tests. 
Moreover, it can be seen that decreasing institutional ownership has a positive effect on the 
announcement return. However, this result is not robust as it cannot be observed in the models 
which exclude the year 2000. Moreover, changes in ownership concentration do not seem to 
have a statistically significant on the announcement return 
Out of the control variables, the six-month run-up preceding the issue has the strongest effect 
on the announcement return, with the influence being positive. In other words, companies 
which issue shares in times of high valuation face more positive announcement returns. 
However, in the models which exclude the year 2000 this effect is somewhat weaker. The 
other control variables do not exhibit a positive or negative effect on the announcement effect 
which would be consistent throughout the models.  
The r-squared figures in the regressions range from 0.09 to 0.12. Thus they do not provided as 
good  as  fit  as  the  regressions  on  the  offer  price  discount,  but  are  still  of  a  relatively  good  
level. 
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Table 12: OLS regressions on announcement effect 
The table presents the results from the OLS regressions. The models labeled with an “a” represent the whole data sample, whereas the models labeled with a “b” represent the 
whole data sample excluding the year 2000. The dependent variable is the announcement CAR of the SEO for the event window [-1,0]. The independent variables are as 
follows: FMO is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the offer is a fully marketed offer, and 0 otherwise. BD is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the 
offer is a bought deal, and 0 otherwise. PREINST is the fraction of shares held by institutional investors before the offer. PRECONC is the fraction of shares held by the ten 
largest shareholders before the offer. CHANGEINST is the change in institutional ownership measured as the %-point difference from before the offer to after the offer. 
CHANGECONC is the change in ownership concentration measured as the %-point difference from before the offer to after the offer. TAKEUP is the fraction of new shares 
subscribed in the offer by existing shareholders. 6MRUNUP is the cumulative index adjusted abnormal return during the six months before the announcement of the offering. 
TURNOVER is the average monthly trading volume divided by the amount of shares from the 12 months before the announcement of the offering. VOLA is the 6-month 
volatility of daily returns before the announcement of the offering. MB is the market-to-book ratio 5 days before the announcement of the offering. RELSIZE is the proceeds 
of the issue divided by the total market value 5 days before the announcement of the offering. MARKETCAP is the natural logarithm of the total market value of the issuing 
company 5 days before the announcement of the offer. EBITMARGIN is the EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) margin of the issuing company in the year of the offer. 
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
Model
Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif.
FMO -0.01 -0.60 -0.01 -0.40 -0.01 -0.53 0.00 -0.21
BD 0.01 1.66 * 0.02 1.75 0.01 1.54 0.01 1.66 *
PREINST 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.65 0.00 0.27 0.01 0.88 0.02 1.11 0.02 1.45
PRECONC 0.05 0.89 0.05 0.80 0.04 0.65 0.04 0.68 -0.01 -0.86 -0.01 -0.61
CHANGEINST -0.12 -2.32 ** -0.09 -1.40 -0.12 -2.20 ** -0.08 -1.29 -0.12 -2.49 ** -0.09 -1.70 *
CHANGECONC 0.12 1.83 * 0.08 1.107 0.11 1.63 0.07 1.00 0.07 1.97 0.04 0.92
TAKEUP -0.05 -0.91 -0.06 -0.95 -0.04 -0.68 -0.05 -0.79
6MRUNUP 0.03 3.98 *** 0.03 1.94 * 0.03 3.52 *** 0.02 1.62 0.04 4.07 *** 0.03 2.03 ** 0.03 3.78 *** 0.02 1.89 * 0.03 3.94 *** 0.03 1.91 *
TURNOVER 0.01 1.57 0.01 1.98 0.01 1.72 * 0.01 2.32 ** 0.01 1.65 * 0.01 2.05 ** 0.01 1.65 0.01 2.21 ** 0.01 1.76 * 0.01 2.25 **
VOLA 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.41 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.47 0.01 0.26 0.01 0.54 0.01 0.31 0.02 0.67 0.01 0.30 0.01 0.51
MB 0.00 -1.31 0.00 -2.35 ** 0.00 -1.15 0.00 -2.27 ** 0.00 -1.07 0.00 -1.85 * 0.00 -0.98 0.00 -1.91 * 0.00 -1.02 0.00 -1.76 *
RELSIZE 0.03 1.52 0.02 0.91 0.03 1.60 0.02 0.86 0.04 2.15 ** 0.03 1.56 0.04 2.35 ** 0.03 1.59 0.04 2.29 ** 0.03 1.66
MARKETCAP 0.00 -1.55 0.00 -0.99 0.00 -2.24 ** 0.00 -1.43 0.00 -1.47 0.00 -1.15 0.00 -1.53 0.00 -1.33 0.00 -1.87 * 0.00 -1.26
EBITMARGIN 0.01 1.16 0.01 0.56 0.01 0.89 0.00 0.30 0.01 1.02 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.82 0.00 0.33 0.01 1.01 0.01 0.49
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 364 298 364 298 364 298 364 298 364 298
R-squared 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.09
(5b)(5a)(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a)(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
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6.3. Post-issue returns 
This section of the study concentrates on analyzing the long-run buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns subsequent to the offer. Firstly, the returns of companies with different offer types are 
presented, followed by the returns of subgroups based on ownership characteristics, including 
post-issue characteristics and changes in ownership characteristics.  
The figure below shows the post-issue buy-and-hold abnormal returns subsequent to the offer 
based  on  the  offer  type.  It  can  be  seen  that  issues  carried  out  by  an  accelerated  bookbuilt  
process have performed better relative to bought deals and fully marketed offerings. However, 
it should be noted that also accelerated bookbuilt offerings have underperformed relative to 
market indices.  
From Figure 9 below it can be seen that companies carrying out bought deals and fully 
marketed offerings overperform in the first months after the issue, but gradually start 
underperforming. For companies carrying out accelerated bookbuilt offerings on the other 
hand the share price development is more stable – neither a sharp rise right after the issue nor 
strong underperformance in the longer run can be observed.  
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Figure 9: BHAR following the SEO for different issue types 
The table presents the buy-and-hold abnormal returns up to 36 months subsequent to the SEO for each offer 
type. ABB refers to accelerated bookbuilt offerings, BD to bought deals, and FMO to fully marketed offerings. 
The horizontal axis represents the months after the offer. Country indices have been used as benchmarks. 
 
 
Figure 10 presents the post-issue buy-and-hold abnormal returns subsequent to the offer for 
subgroups based on post-issue institutional ownership. It can be seen that the quartile with the 
most institutional ownership has performed the best in the 36-month period following the 
issue. Also this subgroup has underperformed relative to market indices. The relationship 
between post-issue institutional ownership and returns does not seem to be straightforward 
however, as the quartile with the least institutional ownership has performed second to best 
during the time period. The in-between quartiles have performed clearly the worst.  
The quartile with the most institutional holding is at its highest level relative to the other 
quartiles at approximately 24 months after the issue, but as the 36-month time interval 
approaches the difference to the other quartiles decreases. This indicates that institutional 
investors have an ability to exert positive influence into companies, but that after a certain 
time frame this becomes unnoticeable, possible due to the fact that ownership structures 
change in companies as time goes by.  
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The  stock  price  performance  of  the  quartile  with  most  institutional  ownership  has  been  the  
most stable of the subgroups, neither experiencing a sharp rise right after the issue nor 
underperformance in the longer run to the same extent as the other quartiles. The quartile with 
the most institutional holding on the other hand experiences a relatively sharp rise in stock 
price immediately after the issue, but soon starts falling strongly.  
Figure 10: BHAR following the SEO for quartiles based on post-issue institutional 
ownership 
The table presents the buy-and-hold abnormal returns up to 36 months subsequent to the SEO for quartiles based 
on post-issue institutional ownership. The 4th quartile represents the quartile with the most post-issue 
institutional ownership, and the 1st quartile the quartile with the least. The horizontal axis represents the months 
after the offer. Country indices have been used as benchmarks.  
 
Figure 11 presents the post-issue buy-and-hold abnormal returns subsequent to the offer for 
subgroups based on post-issue ownership concentration. It can be seen that the quartile with 
the most ownership concentration has performed clearly the worst in the 36-month period 
following the issue. It should be noted again that all of the quartiles have underperformed to 
market indices. The quartile with the least ownership concentration has performed the best of 
the quartiles, with the in-between quartiles performing relatively similarly. This leads to the 
conclusion that ownership concentration destroys value.  
The quartile with the least ownership concentration also experiences the highest rise right 
after the issue. However, this quartile does not start underperforming relative to the other 
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quartiles, like is the case with the subgroups based on offer type and post-issue institutional 
ownership.  
Figure 11: BHAR following the SEO for quartiles based on post-issue ownership 
concentration 
The table presents the buy-and-hold abnormal returns up to 36 months subsequent to the SEO for quartiles based 
on post-issue ownership concentration. The 4th quartile represents the quartile with the most post-issue 
ownership concentration, and the 1st quartile the quartile with the least. The horizontal axis represents the months 
after the offer. Country indices have been used as benchmarks.  
 
Tables 13 and 14 present the results from statistical tests for 24 and 36-month buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns performed on the subgroups, including those based on the offer type, post-
issue institutional ownership, post-issue ownership concentration, changes in institutional 
ownership, and changes in ownership concentration.  
The tables show that the mean figures differ from the median figures somewhat, implying that 
there are is high irregularity in the sample returns. For issue method, it can be seen that fully 
marketed offerings have underperformed relative to accelerated offers. However, this result is 
not statistically significant for neither the means nor the median. However, accelerated 
bookbuilt offerings have overperformed, when measured by means, relative to the other two 
offer type categories by 9.83% (significant at the 5% level) in the 24-month period and by 
11.96% (significant at the 10% level) in the 36-month period following the offer. The median 
figures also provide statistically significant results.  
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For post-issue institutional ownership, it can be seen that the quartile with the most 
institutional ownership has overperformed, when measured by means, relative to the other 
three quartiles by 15.75% (significant at the 1% level) in the 24-month period and by 9.22% 
in the 36-month period following the offer. Moreover, when measured by medians, the 
respective figures are 24.49% (significant at the 1% level) and 17.58% (significant at the 5% 
level). Also here it can be seen that the positive effect of institutional ownership decreases as 
the 36-month time interval approaches.  
For post-issue ownership concentration, it can be seen that the quartile with the least 
ownership concentration has overperformed, when measured by means, relative to the other 
three quartiles by 12.52% (significant at the 5% level) in the 24-month period and by 22.12% 
(significant at the 1% level) in the 36-month time period following the offer. Moreover, when 
measured by medians, the respective figures are 16.29% (significant at the 5% level) and 
22.49% (significant at the 1% level). 
Interestingly,  changes  in  ownership  concentration  seem to  work  in  the  other  direction  –  the  
subgroup with above-median increases in ownership concentration overperformed, when 
measured by means, relative to the subgroup with below-median increases in ownership 
concentration by 15.94% (significant at the 1% level) in the 24-month period and by 17.58% 
(significant at the 1% level) in the 36-month time period following the offer. Changes in 
institutional ownership however did not have an impact on the returns at a statistically 
significant level.  
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Table 13: 24-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns for sample subgroups 
The table presents the mean and median 24-month buy-and-hold abnormal (BHAR) returns for sample subgroups based on issue method (panel A), pre-issue ownership 
characteristics (panel B), and changes in ownership characteristics resulting from the issue (panel C). Country indices are used as benchmarks. ABB refers to accelerated 
bookbuilt offerings, BD to bought deals, and FMO to fully marketed offerings. For ownership characteristics, the 4th quartile has the most and the 1st quartile the least of the 
variable in question. The one-sided student t-test represents the statistical significance for the mean differing from zero for all columns except for the ones which measure 
difference. For the columns which measure difference, the one-sided student t-test represents the statistical significance for the means for the two subgroups in question 
differing from each other, whereas the Wilcoxon signed rank test represents the same for the medians. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 
the 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Issue method
Mean -9.24% 9.83% 0.08% -8.22% -13.45% -4.21% -9.75%
Median -11.80% 11.92% -7.05% -18.97% -22.91% -11.11% -18.97%
One-sided student t-test p-value 0.10 0.04 ** 0.49 0.04 ** 0.02 ** 0.09 * <0.01 ***
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.20 0.08 *
Panel B: Post-issue ownership characteristics
Mean 6.47% 15.75% -2.60% -9.07% 5.98% -11.18% -13.93% -4.20% -9.77%
Median 10.83% 24.49% -7.35% -18.18% 4.90% -22.69% -20.08% -16.35% -19.59%
One-sided student t-test p-value 0.14 <0.01 *** 0.26 0.01 ** 0.12 0.03 ** <0.01 *** 0.27 <0.01 ***
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.09 * <0.01 ***
Mean -3.28% 12.52% -7.47% -4.19% -14.71% -0.24% -11.91% 3.52% -9.00%
Median -5.33% 16.24% -16.19% -10.86% -27.19% -11.06% -17.09% -0.81% -17.05%
One-sided student t-test p-value 0.28 0.03 ** 0.04 ** 0.14 <0.01 *** 0.48 <0.01 *** 0.27 <0.01 ***
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.39 0.03 **
Panel C: Changes in ownership characteristics
Mean -0.41% -6.04% -5.63% -3.81% -8.27% 1.07% -12.34%
Median -9.12% -18.80% -9.68% -22.27% -13.12% -7.52% -11.13%
One-sided student t-test p-value 0.47 0.08 * 0.07 * 0.27 0.08 0.43 <0.01 ***
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.08 *
Mean 15.94% 2.14% -13.80% -2.56% 6.83% -13.51% -14.10%
Median 14.64% -4.64% -19.28% -9.41% -0.64% -15.71% -23.03%
One-sided student t-test p-value <0.00 *** 0.30 <0.00 *** 0.33 0.13 <0.00 *** <0.00 ***
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value <0.00 ***
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Table 14: 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns for sample subgroups 
The table presents the mean and median 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal (BHAR) returns for sample subgroups based on issue method (panel A), pre-issue ownership 
characteristics (panel B), and changes in ownership characteristics resulting from the issue (panel C). Country indices are used as benchmarks. ABB refers to accelerated 
bookbuilt offerings, BD to bought deals, and FMO to fully marketed offerings. For ownership characteristics, the 4th quartile has the most and the 1st quartile the least of the 
variable in question. The one-sided student t-test represents the statistical significance for the mean differing from zero for all columns except for the ones which measure 
difference. For the columns which measure difference, the one-sided student t-test represents the statistical significance for the means for the two subgroups in question 
differing from each other, whereas the Wilcoxon signed rank test represents the same for the medians. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 
the 10% level. 
Panel A: Issue method
Mean -8.95% 11.96% 1.40% -9.49% -13.17% -4.23% -10.56%
Median -11.23% 18.44% -10.41% -28.97% -27.92% -16.70% -28.85%
One-sided student t-test p-value 0.16 0.05 * 0.40 0.06 * 0.05 ** 0.15 0.02 **
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.21 0.04 **
Panel B: Post-issue ownership characteristics
Mean -0.05% 9.22% -5.82% -5.78% 1.12% -12.76% -12.83% 1.27% -8.11%
Median 10.18% 17.58% -16.38% -26.56% -8.71% -26.29% -23.61% -28.75% -26.29%
One-sided student t-test p-value 0.50 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.43 0.04 ** 0.03 ** 0.44 0.03 **
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.09 * 0.03 **
Mean -12.70% 22.12% -12.15% 0.55% -17.11% -7.19% -9.70% 10.81% -11.31%
Median -15.91% 22.49% -29.08% -13.17% -38.33% -16.13% -21.43% -3.49% -25.99%
One-sided student t-test p-value 0.04 ** <0.01 *** 0.01 ** 0.46 0.02 ** 0.14 0.06 * 0.09 * <0.01 ***
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.03 ** <0.01 ***
Panel C: Changes in ownership characteristics
Mean -0.78% -6.19% -5.41% -8.26% -4.12% 6.13% -16.94%
Median -10.70% -26.64% -15.94% -25.08% -28.97% -9.99% -24.01%
One-sided student t-test p-value 0.46 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.31 0.22 <0.01 ***
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.10
Mean 17.58% 2.99% -14.59% -2.84% 8.82% -11.49% -17.69%
Median 11.63% -14.93% -26.56% -19.66% -9.61% -26.99% -25.59%
One-sided student t-test p-value <0.00 *** 0.30 <0.01 *** 0.36 0.14 0.05 ** <0.01 ***
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value 0.02 ** 0.13
Accelerated
(ABB and BD) BD and FMO
Difference 
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Difference 
(4th quartile vs. others)
FMO
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For a more thorough investigation of the buy-and-hold abnormal returns subsequent to the 
issue, regression analysis has been applied. In Tables 15 and 16 on the following pages the 
results from OLS regressions are presented, with the independent variables being the 24 and 
36-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
The regressions show that the issue method does not have an effect on neither the 24 nor 36-
month returns after controlling for firm characteristics. This indicates that the earlier evidence 
from the mean and median tests that accelerated bookbuilt offerings overperform relative to 
the other two offer type is a result of other firm characteristics and not actually the issue 
method. 
Post-issue institutional ownership has an effect on 24-month returns at the 1% level. 
However, this phenomenon cannot be observed any longer with 36-month returns. This could 
be caused by the ownership changing over time or by the 36-month period simply including 
too much noise for the effect to be noticeable. The negative effect of post-issue ownership 
concentration however persists better and is also noticeable with 36-month returns, being 
significant at the 5% level in all models except for 4b, where it is significant at the 1% level. 
With 24-month returns, the negative effect is significant at the 5% level in all models. 
Changes around the issue in institutional ownership and ownership concentration do not have 
an effect on the returns in any of the models after controlling for firm characteristics.  
Out of the control variables, especially the 6-month run-up preceding the issue, the market-to-
book ratio and the profitability of the issuing company have an effect on returns. The r-
squared values of the models are higher when the 24-months returns are under investigation, 
ranging between 0.22 and 0.26. The r-squared values for the models which investigate the 36-
month returns range between 0.16 and 0.19, but nevertheless providing a relatively good fit.   
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Table 15: OLS regressions on 24-month post-issue BHAR 
The table presents the results from the OLS regressions. The models labeled with an “a” represent the whole data sample, whereas the models labeled with a “b” represent the 
whole data sample excluding the year 2000. The dependent variable is the 24-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns following the SEO. Country indices are used as 
benchmarks. The independent variables are as follows: FMO is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the offer is a fully marketed offer, and 0 otherwise. BD is a 
dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the offer is a bought deal, and 0 otherwise. POSTINST is the fraction of shares held by institutional investors after the offer. 
POSTCONC is the fraction of shares held by the ten largest shareholders after the offer. CHANGEINST is the change in institutional ownership measured as the %-point 
difference from before the offer to after the offer. CHANGECONC is the change in ownership concentration measured as the %-point difference from before the offer to after 
the offer. TAKEUP is the fraction of new shares subscribed in the offer by existing shareholders. 6MRUNUP is the cumulative index adjusted abnormal return during the six 
months  before  the  announcement  of  the  offering.  TURNOVER  is  the  average  monthly  trading  volume  divided  by  the  amount  of  shares  from  the  12  months  before  the  
announcement of the offering. VOLA is the 6-month volatility of daily returns before the announcement of the offering. MB is the market-to-book ratio 5 days before the 
announcement of the offering. RELSIZE is the proceeds of the issue divided by the total market value 5 days before the announcement of the offering. MARKETCAP is the 
natural logarithm of the total market value of the issuing company 5 days before the announcement of the offer. EBITMARGIN is the EBIT (earnings before interest and 
taxes) margin of the issuing company in the year of the offer. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
Model
Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif.
FMO 0.12 1.61 0.12 1.28 0.05 0.73 0.03 0.37
BD 0.05 0.84 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.74 0.00 -0.05
POSTINST 0.35 3.11 *** 0.39 3.30 *** 0.32 2.93 *** 0.36 3.08 *** 0.32 2.85 *** 0.36 3.01 ***
POSTCONC -0.82 -2.60 *** -0.74 -2.14 ** -0.77 -2.53 ** -0.66 -2.06 ** -0.26 -2.15 ** -0.25 -2.04 **
CHANGEINST -0.07 -0.22 0.06 0.19 -0.05 -0.16 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.08 0.04 0.11
CHANGECONC 0.28 1.31 0.07 0.25 0.27 1.30 0.10 0.38 0.08 0.41 -0.08 -0.32
TAKEUP 0.55 1.71 * 0.50 1.41 0.54 1.73 * 0.44 1.28
6MRUNUP 0.27 4.10 *** 0.43 4.69 *** 0.25 3.78 *** 0.42 4.75 *** 0.28 4.24 *** 0.43 4.92 *** 0.28 4.24 *** 0.44 5.00 *** 0.26 3.90 *** 0.42 4.81 ***
TURNOVER 0.08 2.67 *** 0.08 2.65 *** 0.09 3.20 *** 0.09 3.18 *** 0.08 2.74 *** 0.08 2.68 *** 0.07 2.59 *** 0.08 2.58 ** 0.09 3.20 *** 0.09 3.20 ***
VOLA -0.25 -2.04 ** -0.16 -1.02 -0.33 -2.70 *** -0.25 -1.62 -0.25 -2.04 ** -0.18 -1.11 -0.28 -2.30 ** -0.20 -1.31 -0.33 -2.65 *** -0.25 -1.60
MB -0.06 -5.78 *** -0.06 -4.66 *** -0.06 -5.57 *** -0.06 -4.21 *** -0.06 -5.86 *** -0.06 -4.90 *** -0.06 -5.92 *** -0.06 -4.88 *** -0.06 -5.66 *** -0.06 -4.46 ***
RELSIZE -0.20 -1.74 * -0.13 -1.05 -0.26 -2.25 ** -0.17 -1.31 -0.16 -1.55 -0.12 -1.10 -0.18 -1.83 * -0.14 -1.27 -0.22 -2.19 ** -0.17 -1.51
MARKETCAP 0.01 2.09 ** 0.00 0.97 0.01 2.99 *** 0.01 1.90 * 0.01 2.23 ** 0.01 1.08 0.01 2.54 ** 0.01 1.38 0.01 3.25 *** 0.01 1.93 *
EBITMARGIN 0.28 4.69 *** 0.27 3.64 *** 0.27 4.59 *** 0.26 3.60 *** 0.28 4.61 *** 0.27 3.60 *** 0.27 4.59 *** 0.26 3.60 *** 0.27 4.56 *** 0.26 3.62 ***
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 364 298 364 298 364 298 364 298 364 298
R-squared 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22
(1a) (3a) (5a)(2a) (4a)(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
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Table 16: OLS regressions on 36-month post-issue BHAR 
The table presents the results from the OLS regressions. The models labeled with an “a” represent the whole data sample, whereas the models labeled with a “b” represent the 
whole data sample excluding the year 2000. The dependent variable is the 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns following the SEO. Country indices are used as 
benchmarks. The independent variables are as follows: FMO is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the offer is a fully marketed offer, and 0 otherwise. BD is a 
dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the offer is a bought deal, and 0 otherwise. POSTINST is the fraction of shares held by institutional investors after the offer. 
POSTCONC is the fraction of shares held by the ten largest shareholders after the offer. CHANGEINST is the change in institutional ownership measured as the %-point 
difference from before the offer to after the offer. CHANGECONC is the change in ownership concentration measured as the %-point difference from before the offer to after 
the offer. TAKEUP is the fraction of new shares subscribed in the offer by existing shareholders. 6MRUNUP is the cumulative index adjusted abnormal return during the six 
months  before  the  announcement  of  the  offering.  TURNOVER  is  the  average  monthly  trading  volume  divided  by  the  amount  of  shares  from  the  12  months  before  the  
announcement of the offering. VOLA is the 6-month volatility of daily returns before the announcement of the offering. MB is the market-to-book ratio 5 days before the 
announcement of the offering. RELSIZE is the proceeds of the issue divided by the total market value 5 days before the announcement of the offering. MARKETCAP is the 
natural logarithm of the total market value of the issuing company 5 days before the announcement of the offer. EBITMARGIN is the EBIT (earnings before interest and 
taxes) margin of the issuing company in the year of the offer. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 
Model
Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif. Coeff. t-Stat. Signif.
FMO 0.10 1.05 0.07 0.54 0.04 0.40 -0.01 -0.08
BD 0.05 0.58 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.39 -0.01 -0.14
POSTINST 0.21 1.29 0.20 1.14 0.18 1.19 0.18 1.10 0.17 1.13 0.17 1.04
POSTCONC -0.89 -2.11 ** -0.76 -2.07 ** -0.84 -2.05 ** -0.72 -2.04 -0.36 -2.04 ** -0.32 -1.92 *
CHANGEINST 0.05 0.12 0.17 0.34 0.06 0.16 0.14 0.30 0.06 0.16 0.14 0.29
CHANGECONC 0.39 1.23 0.18 0.43 0.39 1.22 0.19 0.48 0.16 0.57 -0.01 -0.03
TAKEUP 0.49 1.12 0.44 0.92 0.48 1.10 0.42 0.85
6MRUNUP 0.26 3.22 *** 0.50 4.20 *** 0.25 3.00 *** 0.50 4.46 *** 0.26 3.26 *** 0.50 4.30 *** 0.26 3.27 *** 0.51 4.47 *** 0.25 3.01 *** 0.50 4.29 ***
TURNOVER 0.05 1.15 0.06 1.36 0.06 1.43 0.06 1.59 0.05 1.18 0.06 1.37 0.04 1.08 0.05 1.29 0.06 1.43 0.06 1.59
VOLA -0.19 -1.26 -0.15 -0.82 -0.25 -1.71 * -0.21 -1.14 -0.19 -1.27 -0.16 -0.87 -0.22 -1.50 -0.18 -1.01 -0.25 -1.67 * -0.21 -1.14
MB -0.07 -4.90 *** -0.07 -4.63 *** -0.07 -4.89 *** -0.07 -4.42 *** -0.07 -4.93 *** -0.07 -4.69 *** -0.07 -4.99 *** -0.07 -4.65 *** -0.07 -4.98 *** -0.07 -4.64 ***
RELSIZE -0.22 -1.51 -0.14 -0.89 -0.29 -2.11 ** -0.18 -1.20 -0.18 -1.35 -0.13 -0.89 -0.20 -1.58 -0.15 -1.03 -0.27 -2.13 ** -0.20 -1.39
MARKETCAP 0.01 1.93 * 0.01 1.13 0.01 1.66 * 0.00 0.93 0.01 2.03 *** 0.01 1.17 0.01 2.19 ** 0.01 1.32 0.01 1.81 * 0.00 0.94
EBITMARGIN 0.32 4.32 *** 0.29 3.33 *** 0.30 4.23 *** 0.28 3.31 *** 0.31 4.32 *** 0.29 3.32 *** 0.31 4.38 *** 0.29 3.42 *** 0.30 4.24 *** 0.28 3.27 ***
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 364 298 364 298 298 298 298
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17
(2a) (3a)
yes
364364
0.17
(4b)(1a) (5a)
yes
(1b) (2b) (3b) (5b)
364
0.16
(4a)
yes
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6.4. Choice of issue method 
For an investigation of the choice of issue method, logit regression is applied. The regressions 
in Table 17 show that pre-issue institutional holding has a strong influence on the issue 
method – the more institutional holding there is higher likelihood the issue is an accelerated 
issue. This indicates that when a company has high institutional holding, the SEO does not 
need to be marketed to such a high extent because institutional investors are often more 
informed than the average investor, and therefore the issuing company is likely to choose an 
accelerated offer. This result is significant at the 1% level in all of the models, including the 
ones which exclude the year 2000. Pre-issue ownership concentration seems to increase the 
likelihood of  a  fully  marketed  offer.  This  result  is  significant  at  the  5% level  in  all  models  
except for 2b, where it is significant at the 10% level. All in all, it can be said that this result is 
relatively robust.  
Changes in institutional ownership and ownership concentration have a statistically 
significant effect on the choice of issue method in the “b” models, where the year 2000 is 
excluded. Increasing institutional ownership increases the likelihood of an accelerated offer, 
whereas increasing ownership concentration increases the likelihood of a fully marketed offer. 
However, in the “a” models where the year 2000 is included, these relationships cannot be 
found.  
Out of the control variables, high market capitalisation of the issuing firm increases the 
likelihood of  an  accelerated  offer,  this  result  being  significant  at  the  1% level  in  all  models  
except for 1b, where it is significant at the 5% level. This can be explained by larger firms not 
requiring exhaustive marketing efforts, as it is likely that potential investors are relatively 
familiar  with  them to  begin  with.  Moreover,  as  Bortolotti  et  al.  state,  accelerated  offers  are  
employed for shares of large and well known companies. 
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Table 17: Logit regressions on choice of issue method 
The table presents the results from the logit regression. The models labeled with an “a” represent the whole data sample, whereas the models labeled with a “b” represent the 
whole data sample excluding the year 2000. The dependent variable is the issue method, which is a dichotomous variable for which fully marketed offerings takes a value of 
1, and for accelerated issues, including accelerated bookbuilt offerings and bought deals, takes a value of 0. The independent variables are as follows: PREINST is the 
fraction of shares held by institutional investors before the offer. PRECONC is the fraction of shares held by the ten largest shareholders before the offer. CHANGEINST is 
the change in institutional ownership measured as the %-point difference from before the offer to after the offer. CHANGECONC is the change in ownership concentration 
measured as the %-point difference from before the offer to after the offer. TAKEUP is the fraction of new shares subscribed in the offer by existing shareholders. DEAL1Y 
is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the issuing company has conducted an equity issue in the time period of one year before the offer, and 0 otherwise. 
6MRUNUP is the cumulative index adjusted abnormal return during the six months before the announcement of the offering. TURNOVER is the average monthly trading 
volume divided by the amount of shares from the 12 months before the announcement of the offering. VOLA is the 6-month volatility of daily returns before the 
announcement of the offering. MB is the market-to-book ratio 5 days before the announcement of the offering. RELSIZE is the proceeds of the issue divided by the total 
market value 5 days before the announcement of the offering. MARKETCAP is the natural logarithm of the total market value of the issuing company 5 days before the 
announcement of the offer. EBITMARGIN is the EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) margin of the issuing company in the year of the offer. *** denotes significance at 
the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 
Model (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Coeff. z-Stat. Signif. Coeff. z-Stat. Signif. Coeff. z-Stat. Signif. Coeff. z-Stat. Signif. Coeff. z-Stat. Signif. Coeff. z-Stat. Signif.
PREINST -3.53 -3.54 *** -3.82 -2.77 *** -3.04 -3.53 *** -2.72 2.79 ***
PRECONC 4.07 2.30 ** 4.36 2.29 ** 1.66 2.18 ** 0.99 2.01 *
CHANGEINST -3.21 -1.36 -8.58 -3.41 *** 0.41 0.20 -5.20 -2.34 **
CHANGECONC 3.53 1.50 7.21 2.74 *** 0.35 0.23 4.78 2.58 ***
TAKEUP -2.29 -1.02 -2.74 -0.96
DEAL1Y -0.62 -1.59 -1.38 -1.75 * -0.63 -1.65 * -1.16 -1.64 -0.59 -1.61 -1.36 -1.82 *
6MRUNUP 0.02 0.06 0.90 1.85 * -0.03 -0.11 0.50 1.00 0.20 0.68 0.98 1.94 *
TURNOVER 0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.20 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.45 -0.14 -0.63
VOLA -0.65 -0.96 -1.16 -1.15 -0.60 -0.90 -0.68 -0.75 -0.01 -0.01 -0.45 -0.53
MB -0.05 -0.57 -0.13 -0.82 -0.03 -0.35 -0.10 -0.70 -0.07 -0.93 -0.20 -1.28
RELSIZE 0.63 0.90 0.73 0.82 0.78 1.23 0.74 0.99 0.86 1.37 0.91 1.12
MARKETCAP -0.12 -3.69 *** -0.10 -2.28 ** -0.13 -4.13 *** -0.11 -2.70 *** -0.14 -5.34 *** -0.12 -3.86 ***
EBITMARGIN 0.16 0.35 0.22 0.39 0.08 0.19 -0.02 -0.03 0.19 0.44 0.23 0.41
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
N 298 298 364 298
Pseudo R-squared 0.27 0.22 0.15 0.21 0.160.26
yes
364
yes
364
Fully marketed offer = 1
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6.5. Summary of results 
Table 18 pools the empirical results of the thesis together. As to the hypotheses relating to the 
offer price discount, the key finding is that fully marketed offerings suffer to a lesser extent 
from the offer price discount than accelerated offers. As to the hypotheses relating to long-run 
post-issue returns, the results show that institutional ownership has a positive effect and 
ownership concentration a negative effect on firm value. As to the choice of issue method, it 
can be seen that companies with high pre-issue institutional ownership are more likely to 
choose an accelerated offer, whereas companies with high pre-issue ownership concentration 
are more likely to choose an accelerated offer.   
The results regarding the offer price discount provide evidence at the 1% level that in fully 
marketed offerings the offer price is lower than in accelerated offers. Moreover, this result is 
prevails also after excluding the year 2000, and can therefore be considered as robust. 
Ownership  characteristics  on  the  other  hand  do  not  seem  to  affect  the  offer  price  discount,  
unlike hypothesised. Also, changes in ownership characteristics resulting from the issue 
neither seem to affect the discount.  
What comes to long-run returns subsequent to the SEO, the results show that institutional 
ownership has a strong and statistically positive effect on 24-month returns, but that on 36-
month returns it does not have an effect. In the mean and median tests it was found that 
especially the quartile with the most institutional holding performs well subsequent to the 
offer, but that the relationship with the other three quartiles is less straightforward. Moreover, 
ownership concentration has a strong and statistically negative effect on long-run returns 
subsequent to the offer – this result prevailing also with 36-month returns in addition to 24-
month returns and also after excluding the year 2000. However, changes in institutional 
ownership  and  ownership  concentration  do  not  seem  to  have  an  effect  on  long-run  returns,  
unlike hypothesised. The offer method seemed to contribute to long-run returns in the mean 
and median tests to some extent, but after controlling for firms characteristics in the OLS 
regressions no evidence is found of this.  
The choice of issue method seems to be affected by both pre-issue institutional ownership and 
pre-issue ownership concentration, like hypothesised. For the former, the results are 
significant at the 1% level and robust. For the former the results are significant at the 5% level 
and also robust.  
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Table 18: Summary of empirical results 
The table pools together the empirical results of the thesis by each of studied hypothesis. Hypotheses 1-3 relate 
to the offer price discount, hypotheses 4-6 to long-run post-issue returns, and hypotheses 7-8 to the choice of 
issue method. The empirical findings rely mainly on OLS and logit regressions.  
 
    
Hypothesis Empirical evidence
Offer price discount
H1a High pre-issue institutional ownership decreases the offer price discount No evidence from OLS regressions.
H1b Increasing institutional ownership from the issue decreases the offer price discount No evidence from OLS regressions.
H2a High pre-issue ownership concentration increases the offer price discount No evidence from OLS regressions.
H2b Increasing ownership concentration from the issue increases the offer price discount No evidence from OLS regressions.
H3 An accelerated offer increases the offer price discount
Evidence from OLS regression at the 1% level and 
robust also after exluding the year 2000.
Long-run returns
H4a High post-issue institutional ownership increases long-run post-issue returns
Evidence from OLS regression at the 1% level for 
24-month period and robust also after excluding 
the year 2000. However, no evidence for 36-
month period.
H4b Increasing institutional ownership increases long-run post-issue returns No evidence from OLS regressions.
H5a High post-issue ownership concentration decreases long-run post-issue returns Evidence from OLS regression at the 5% level and 
robust also after exluding the year 2000.
H5b Increasing ownership concentration decreases long-run post-issue returns No evidence from OLS regressions.
H6 An accelerated offer increases long-run post-issue returns No evidence from OLS regressions. 
Choice of issue method
H7 High pre-issue institutional ownership increases the likelihood of an accelerated offer
Evidence from logit regression at the 1% level and 
robust also after excluding the year 2000.
H8 High pre-issue ownership concentration decreases the likelihood of an accelerated offer
Evidence from logit regression at the 5% level and 
robust also after excluding the year 2000.
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7. Conclusion 
 
SEOs have attracted wide attention in academic literature, even though not as high as IPOs. 
The thesis has been motivated by lacking literature regarding different public offer types 
(especially when compared to literature on rights versus public issues), which have only been 
studied in a few papers (e.g. Gao and Ritter, 2007; Bortolotti et al., 2007). Moreover, the 
limited number of studies regarding SEOs and ownership characteristics using European data 
has acted as a further catalyst for the chosen topic. 
The purpose of this study has been to determine whether ownership characteristics, including 
institutional ownership and ownership concentration, in addition to the choice of issue 
method, play a role in the offer price discount and long-run post-issue returns. Also, the 
announcement effect has been studied, even though it has not been explicitly included in the 
hypotheses.  
The results of the study show that the offer price discount in SEOs has been the highest for 
accelerated offers, including accelerated bookbuilt offerings and bought deals. The lower 
offer price discount for fully marketed offers can be observed from the mean and median tests 
in addition to the regressions (significant at the 1% level and robust also after excluding the 
year 2000). This finding supports the results from previous studies, including Rinne and 
Suominen (2009) and Huang and Zhang (2009). However, the thesis provides new evidence 
in the sense that it compares three public issue types taking place in Europe, whereas Rinne 
and Suominen (2009) study differences between rights and public offers (albeit in Europe), 
and whereas Huang and Zhang (2009) use SEO from the US and study the impact of the 
number of managing underwriters. On the other hand, the thesis contradicts the findings of 
Bortolotti et al. (2007), who find that accelerated offers in Europe exhibit less underpricing 
than non-accelerated offers. This can partly be explained by the classification that Bortolotti 
et al. (2007) use.  
The lower discount for fully marketed offerings can be explained at least partly by the 
marketing conducted by investment banks in fully marketed offers. During the marketing 
period, investment bankers working on behalf of the issuing company have time to firstly 
promote the offer to investors, and to secondly gain information regarding the demand-level 
of the market. The first factors contributes to the issuing company not having to set the 
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discount at a high level, as investors will be more keen to purchase shares anyway after a 
period of marketing, promotion and hype-creation. The second factor contributes to the 
issuing company and its investment banks not having to set the discount at an unnecessarily 
high level to guarantee the success of the issue. 
Ownership  characteristics,  or  changes  in  them,  on  the  other  hand  do  not  seem to  affect  the  
offer price discount. For example, Intintoli and Kahle (2010) find that ownership 
concentration increases the discount, whereas Chemmanur et al. (2009) find that larger 
institutional allocations are associated with smaller discounts. Both of the studies use data 
from the US. The fact that the thesis uses European data could provide an explanation to the 
ownership characteristics not showing an impact on the discount. Also, ownership structure 
seems to be linked to the discount indirectly through the issue method. High pre-issue 
institutional ownership is associated with accelerated offerings, which are shown to exhibit a 
higher discount, while high pre-issue ownership concentration is associated with fully 
marketed offerings, which are shown to exhibit a lower discount. This further explains why 
ownership characteristics do not directly seem to affect the discount.  
The results also show that the announcement effect across different sub-groups does not differ 
significantly. The main finding as to the announcement return is that in the mean and median 
tests bought deals seem to exhibit more positive returns than the other two offer types studies, 
namely accelerated bookbuilt offerings and fully marketed offerings. However, the 
regressions show that after controlling for firm characteristics, the difference between the 
offer types is not significant. Moreover, the announcement effect cannot be said to be 
statistically significant but remains quite close to zero. 
What come to post-issue returns, the results show that institutional ownership has a positive 
effect on long-run returns during a 24-month time period (significant at the 1% level and 
robust also after excluding the year 2000). This supports the findings of e.g. D’Mello et al. 
(2009), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Chemmanur et al. (2009), and Gao and Mahmudi 
(2008). This can be explained by the monitoring benefit that institutional investors bring to 
companies, and by these investors possessing better stock-picking ability than retail investors. 
However, this result is not observable anymore for a 36-month time period, which could be 
caused by changes in institutional holding during the period. Hence it would be interesting to 
conduct a study where changes in ownership characteristics during the post-issue time period 
would be accounted for, and not only the changes that result from the SEO (as this study has 
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done). This could be performed e.g. by re-balancing portfolios between chosen intervals 
according to changes in ownership characteristics.  
The results also show that ownership concentration decreases long-run returns, supporting the 
findings of e.g. Kothare (1997), Amihud and Mendelson (1986), and Holmstrm and Tirole 
(1993). This result is significant at the 5% level and robust also after excluding the year 2000. 
The result can be explained by various reasons. First of all, ownership concentration reduces 
the  extent  to  which  the  firm  is  followed  by  market  participants,  for  example  analysts.  This  
reduces the amount of information that is available of the firm, leading to increasing 
information asymmetry and consequently lower chances that the average investor would 
invest in the company. Moreover, ownership concentration decreases the liquidity of the 
company, and consequently the attractiveness to investors. However, the results on ownership 
concentration remain even after controlling for liquidity (as measured by share turnover), 
which means that in this case the underperformance due to high ownership concentration is 
not merely a factor caused by low liquidity.  
What  comes  to  the  choice  of  issue  method,  the  results  show  that  high  pre-issue  ownership  
increases the likelihood that the issuing firm chooses to conduct an accelerated offer. This 
result is significant at the 1% level and robust also after excluding the year 2000. The result 
can be interpreted as proof that firms with high institutional holding do not require a thorough 
marketing process, or in other words that institutions do not need to be attracted to invest with 
a high discount because of relatively low information asymmetry, as institutions posses more 
information before the offer than an average investor does. Also, as accelerated offers are 
often targeted at institutional investors, it seems natural that also pre-issue institutional 
ownership has been high to begin with. However, it should be noted that even though 
practitioners have been aware that accelerated deals are often targeted at institutional 
investors, an empirical treatment of pre-issue ownership characteristics has been lacking. 
Moreover, high pre-issue ownership concentration increases the likelihood of a fully marketed 
process (significant at the 5% level and also robust after excluding the year 2000). This can be 
explained by a need for marketing in order to tempt potential investors in relatively illiquid 
stock. These results are novel in the sense that, to the best of my knowledge, there have not 
been empirical papers on the influence of ownership characteristics on the choice between 
accelerated versus fully marketed offerings in Europe. 
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Suggestions for further research include, for example, conducting the study with alternative 
benchmark indices. In this study country indices have been used. One could instead use e.g. 
size and book-to-market matched non-issuers when computing long-run abnormal returns, 
similar to the Fama-French three-factor model or the Fama-Macbeth model. Alternatively one 
could use the Carhart four-factor model, which further takes momentum in stock prices into 
account. Further suggestions for future research would include carrying out the study with a 
longer time period. In this study the period between the years 2000 and 2005 was chosen due 
to two reasons. Firstly, because long-run returns of up to three years were computed, the 
period had to end in 2005 (as the data collection period for the study began in early 2009). 
Secondly, the beginning point for the study was chosen to be the year 2000 because 
ownership data found from Thomson Financial before this is very limited (currently it is not 
as limited, but retrieval still requires a manual process). Moreover, one could choose to carry 
the study out in a different market place. The market used in this study was Europe because 
relatively few academic studies until now have been conducted in this market place, with the 
majority focusing on the United States. It would be interesting to compare the results between 
e.g. Europe, the US and Asia, especially because in Asia ownership characteristics in firms 
often deviate from characteristics in Europe and the US.  
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9.  Appendix 
 
Table 19: Descriptive statistics of variables 
ABB refers to accelerated bookbuilt offerings, BD to bought deals, and FMO to fully marketed offerings. 
 
All ABB BD FMO
Offer price discount mean 8.31% 9.79% 8.36% 4.87%
median 4.65% 4.55% 5.89% 3.57%
Announcement CAR mean 0.22% -0.86% 1.33% -0.02%
median -0.55% -1.41% 0.61% -0.08%
Pre-issue institutional holding mean 30.58% 33.27% 31.13% 23.17%
median 24.20% 24.96% 27.74% 18.95%
Pre-issue ownership concentration mean 45.37% 41.97% 44.00% 56.40%
median 45.48% 40.92% 44.78% 58.00%
Change in institutional holding mean -0.34% -0.94% 0.22% -0.32%
median 0.00% -0.24% 0.17% 0.22%
Change in ownership concentration mean -3.41% -4.00% -2.12% -5.16%
median -1.76% -1.67% -1.62% -4.08%
Post-issue institutional holding mean 30.18% 31.82% 31.66% 22.89%
median 24.31% 23.36% 26.40% 17.90%
Post-issue ownership concentration mean 41.96% 37.71% 42.34% 50.66%
median 41.11% 34.61% 42.53% 51.97%
Takeup mean 38.11% 34.76% 38.27% 45.31%
median 37.84% 31.37% 39.00% 49.27%
24-month buy-and-hold abnormal return mean -5.83% 0.08% -8.22% -13.45%
median -13.74% -7.05% -18.97% -22.91%
36-month buy-and-hold abnormal return mean -5.80% 1.40% -9.49% -13.17%
median -21.47% -10.41% -28.97% -27.92%
6 month run-up mean 22.90% 14.25% 25.71% 35.70%
median 8.92% 2.98% 10.89% 16.11%
Deal value (EURm) mean 277.13 449.01 64.98 401.52
median 50.16 90.31 26.54 85.18
Market cap (EUR m) mean 422.11 971.07 164.53 626.13
median 353.24 806.09 132.67 576.80
Market-to-book mean 2.80x 2.41x 2.99x 3.23x
median 2.05x 2.06x 2.05x 2.05x
Relative issue size mean 24.36% 17.32% 31.45% 23.12%
median 13.91% 10.08% 19.08% 16.06%
Turnover mean 0.67% 0.64% 0.72% 0.61%
median 0.38% 0.38% 0.38% 0.38%
Volatility mean 46.48% 41.21% 47.82% 55.20%
median 39.39% 33.64% 39.39% 55.07%
EBIT margin mean -4.62% 4.27% -12.37% -5.96%
median 5.95% 8.25% 5.71% 5.78%
Variable
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Table 20: Correlation matrix of variables 
The table presents the correlations and their t-values between variables. BHAR36 is the buy-and-hold abnormal 
return for a 36-month time period following the issue. BHAR24 is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for a 24-
month time period following the issue. 6MRUNUP is the cumulative index adjusted abnormal return during the 
six months before the announcement of the offering. ABB represent accelerated bookbuilt offerings. BD 
represents bought deals. FMO represents fully marketed offerings. PRECONC is the fraction of shares held by 
the ten largest shareholders before the offer. PREINST is the fraction of shares held by institutional investors 
before the offer. DISCOUNT is the offer price discount in the offer. POSTCONC is the fraction of shares held 
by the ten largest shareholders after the offer. POSTINST is the fraction of shares held by institutional investors 
after the offer. CHANGECONC is the change in ownership concentration measured as the %-point difference 
from before the offer to after the offer. CHANGEINST is the change in institutional ownership measured as the 
%-point difference from before the offer to after the offer. DEAL1Y is a dummy variable which takes a value of 
1 if the issuing company has conducted an equity issue in the time period of one year before the offer, and 0 
otherwise. TAKEUP is the fraction of new shares subscribed in the offer by existing shareholders. TURNOVER 
is the average monthly trading volume divided by the amount of shares from the 12 months before the 
announcement of the offering. VOLA is the 6-month volatility of daily returns before the announcement of the 
offering. MB is the market-to-book ratio 5 days before the announcement of the offering. RELSIZE is the 
proceeds of the issue divided by the total market value 5 days before the announcement of the offering. 
MARKETCAP is the natural logarithm of the total market value of the issuing company 5 days before the 
announcement of the offer. EBITMARGIN is the EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) margin of the issuing 
company in the year of the offer. ANNEFF is the announcement CAR of the SEO for the event window [-1,0]. 
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